Alarm about alarmism

via Climate Etc.
https://judithcurry.com

by Judith Curry

The climate change debate has entered what we might call the “Campfire Phase”, in which the goal is to tell the scariest story. – Oren Cass (twitter)

David Wallace-Wells has a recent cover story in NYMagazine:  The Uninhabitable Earth.  Subtitle: Famine, economic collapse, a sun that cooks us: What climate change could wreak — sooner than you think.  The article has generated a firestorm of controversy and debate.

In terms of what is technically wrong with the NYMag article, Andy Revkin pretty much sums it up perfectly with this tweet:

Scariest stuff isn’t worst-case science; it’s bad fit of @deepuncertainty & time scales with indiv. & collective human risk/response traits.

Apart from the predictable takedowns by the AGW ‘unconvinced,’ there has been substantial resistance to the NYMag article from elements of what is usually regarded as the ‘alarmed’ contingent:

• Mann et al. in WaPo: and ECOWatch: Such rhetoric is in many ways as pernicious as outright climate change denial, for it leads us down the same path of inaction.
• Climate Feedback: Sixteen scientists analyzed the article and estimated its overall scientific credibility to be ‘low’.  A majority of reviewers tagged the article as: Alarmist, Imprecise/Unclear, Misleading.
• Chris Mooney in WaPo: Scientists challenge story about ‘uninhabitable Earth’
• Ars Technica:  In both the popular and academic press, scientists argue against worst cases

If this reaction seems surprising to you, you are not the only ones surprised:

Ryan Maue (twitter): Privately more than one journalist told me they were afraid to push back against the NY Mag climate horrors piece.

IMO, the most interesting articles are those that defend development and discussion of worst case scenarios:

• Joseph Majkut‏ :  I for one think that worst case scenarios should be interrogated. Technically and morally.
• Joe Romm in ThinkProgress:  Thus, the question remains: what is a plausible worst-case scenario for climate change this century?
• Dave Roberts in Vox: In defense of worst-case scenarios in journalism.

A few other articles with interesting points:

Fabius Maximus: After 30 years of failure to gain support of the US public for massive public policy measures to fight climate change, climate activists now double down on the tactics that have failed them for so long. This post explains why it will not work. Nor should it. Instead they should trust the IPCC and science, showing both the good and bad news.

SF Chronicle: If you honestly believe that climate change will end all life on Earth (it won’t) or lead to some dystopian hell, what policies wouldn’t you endorse to stop it?

Consensus enforcement in the Age of Trump

So, what is going with Mann et al. in trashing the alarming NYMag article?

I saw many such ‘alarmed’ articles (perhaps not as comprehensive) in the Age of Obama, spouting alarmist predictions and concerns.  Further, the White House seemed to encourage this, as evidenced by the whitehouse.gov web site and the statements of Science Advisor John Holdren.  I never saw any push-back on this from the consensus-enforcing scientific establishment.

In the Age of Trump, alarmism clearly doesn’t influence the policy makers; the best that consensus-enforcing scientific establishment can hope for is to enforce the not very scary IPCC consensus.

And why does this matter to them? Surely this consensus enforcement is antithetical to the scientific process and progress.   It seems to be all about ‘action’ — presumably as defined by the Paris Agreement.  According to Mann et al., too much alarm makes people give up on attempting ‘action.’  Never mind that the proposed actions will have a small impact on the climate (even if you believe the climate models) during the 21st century.

Others disagree, such as Weizmann and Wagner (e.g. Climate Shock), who push the alarming ‘fat tail’ argument as the rationale for ‘action’ (greater uncertainty increases the urgency for action).

Well, I suspect that neither approach will spur ‘action’ — what is needed are new technologies.  Until then, people, corporations and nations will pursue their short-term economic well being.

Deep Uncertainty

In understanding climate change risk, and deciding on the ‘if’ and ‘what’ of ‘action’,  we need to acknowledge that we don’t know how the climate of the 21st century will play out (Deep Uncertainty, folks).  Four possibilities:

1. It is possible that human-caused climate change will be swamped by much larger natural climate variability.
2. It is possible/plausible  that the sensitivity of the climate is on the low end of the IPCC envelope (1.0-1.5C), with a slow creep of warming superimposed on much larger natural variability.
3. It is possible/plausible that the IPCC projections are actually correct (right for the wrong reasons; too much wrong with the climate models for much credibility, IMO).
4. It is possible that AGW and natural variability could conspire to cause catastrophic outcomes

We can’t put probabilities on these possible scenarios, the uncertainties are too deep.  We can speculate as to the relative likelihoods of these scenarios, but we don’t know, and there will be widespread disagreement.  The negotiated IPCC notwithstanding, I don’t regard #3 as any more likely than #2.  There are some that regard #1 as the most likely outcome.  Apart from advocacy groups hyping alarm, there has not been much serious attention paid to #4.

The IPCC consensus enforcers focus on #3.  #2 is the lukewarm position.  Michael Mann seems to regard consideration of #1, #2, #4 as ‘pernicious.’

I regard consideration of #1, #2, #4 as absolutely essential for both furthering scientific understanding and for understanding the risks from climate change. #2 gets a fair amount of play from the lukewarmer community (see especially Pat Michael’s book).

#1 and #4 are arguably the most interesting from the perspective of science, and also in terms of understanding the risks.   Elements of natural climate variability are active areas of research; what is missing is a synthesis and assessment (something I’ve proposed for red team).

That leaves #4 as not having any serious scientific focus, beyond dystopian articles by journalists and cli-fi novels (and fat tail speculations by economists).  #4 deserves some serious scientific attention.

A few additional tweets from Joseph Makjut:

• This isnt about scaring people into action or not but thinking hard about what climate change might look like and who it might hurt.
• Likewise, we should interrogate the scenarios where climate change is rather benign. What-up lukewarmers!?!
• Keeping multiple versions of the future world in your head is hard, but wisdom comes from considering them all.

Back to ‘action.’  The Weitzmann fat tail argument says greater uncertainty increases the urgency of ‘action’ (Taleb is a fan of this argument).  I’ve discussed the problems with this argument previously:

• Worst case scenario versus fat tail
• Climate sensitivity: lopping off the fat tail
• Tall tales and fat tails

The point is this.  Climate variability and change (whatever the direction or cause) has socioeconomic impacts, and it useful to ponder the possibilities, independently of ‘action’ on CO2 emissions.

The plausible worst case scenario

Joe Romm states the issue perfectly:

Thus, the question remains: what is a plausible worst-case scenario for climate change this century?

Back in the day when Joe Romm and I were buddies(!), we discussed extensively the plausible worst cast scenarios.  In fact, these were the subject of his book Hell and High Water.

I discussed the creation of worst case scenarios in these posts:

• Is climate change a ‘ruin’ problem?
• Worst case scenario versus fat tail

Based on everything that I’ve seen, it is difficult to conclude that human-caused climate change is a ‘ruin’ problem on the timescale of the 21st century.  But climate change is interesting and important, independently of whether AGW is the dominant factor or not.

To make progress on this, we need to better understand climate shifts and abrupt climate change.  Even though we can’t predict solar variability and volcanic eruptions, we need to consider a range of scenarios of these, not just a replica of the 20th century.  We need to much better understand multi-decadal to millennial oscillations in the ocean.

My understanding of the climate system is that external forcing projects onto the modes of internal variability.  How might these conspire to cause abrupt climate change in the 21st century?

With regards to plausible worst case scenarios, I’ve proposed the idea of a modal falsification test of specific worst case scenarios, that may be generated by climate models, inferred from historical data, or created as what-if scenarios.  The modal falsification challenge is to attempt to falsify these extreme scenarios based on background knowledge (e.g historical climate change, physical limitations).  If a scenario survives the falsification test, then it remains as a possible scenario. ‘Plausibility’ requires another layer of assessment and judgement. (It would be interesting to go back through Romm’s book to assess the plausibility 10 years post publication).

Note, this strategy is very different from the manufacture of mythical fat tails from pdfs (much loved by economists and statisticians) that simply do not exist given the level and types of uncertainties.  However the fat tail approach and generation of plausible worst case scenarios that I propose share a common concern to understand the risk from the ‘worst case.’

One interesting case of plausible worst case scenario generation is provided by Jim Hansen, see this lengthy recent interview with Hansen in the NYMag.

So, assume that we generate a range of worst case future scenarios for the 21st century, ranging from #1 (including the potential for abrupt climate change purely from natural variability), through a range of sensitivities to human caused climate change, to #4 a conspiracy of human caused climate change and natural variability to cause very large climate change.  Then what?

Well, then we are still faced with assessing the issue of whether the changed climate is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and for whom and where.  Not to mention the complexity of a political debate on how we might respond to any of this.

The bottom line is that the simple story pushed by the consensus enforcers of a simple climate problem and a simple energy solution is a goldilocks fairy tale.  Given that their careers have been invested in this fairy tale, its little wonder that they regard anything other than their enforced consensus as ‘pernicious.’

 

via Climate Etc. https://judithcurry.com

July 15, 2017 at 10:00AM

Euopean Climate Institute EIKE Says Antarctica Ice Calving “Totally Normal”, Natural Causes

via NoTricksZone
http://notrickszone.com

The Vice President of the Germany-based European Institute for Climate and Energy (EIKE) Michael Limburg wrote that the recent ice chunk breaking off the Antarctic ice shelf has everything to do with natural cyclic calving, and that the media reporting has been mostly alarmist hype. EIKE writes:

Antarctic ice shelf breaking is a totally normal process – the Antarctic has in fact gotten colder over the pst 30 years.

Germany’s number one tabloid, Bild, blared out the headline on July 13: “South Pole Breaking Apart!” and quoted alarmist climate scientist Mojib Latif: who warned it is a “warning shot to mankind”.

Bild Leipzig July 13, 2017, thanks to Dietmar Ufer

Climate scientist Mojib Latif called it a “warning shot for mankind”. Source: Bild

Mostly drama and hype

However, EIKE writes that such media reports are mainly drama and hype, and that natural mechanical forces and oceanic currents are behind the calving. EIKE cites facts from the Bremen Germany-based Alfred Wegener Institute.

Antarctic sea ice extent has in fact been growing over the past 4 decades, defying global warming. Source: Die kalte Sonne.

EIKE reminds that the recent ice mass breaking off will have no effect on sea level at all because the ice had already been floating on the ocean surface, and that even if the broken off mass had fully displaced the sea water, the magnitude of the resulting global sea level rise would not have been detectable.

Compared to the total Antarctic ice mass, the broken ice chunk with its 1 trillion-ton mass is only 1/26,000 of the entire ice mass at the South Pole.

Sea level rise not accelerating

Moreover, sea level over the past years has slowed down, and not accelerated, EIKE writes:

Slowing sea level rise from 1993 to 2012, Chart: K.E. Puls

Sea level rise stable

Granted the EIKE chart used above is somewhat outdated, and sea level rise has not been slowing down. Paul Homewood here takes an objective look at sea level rise and writes that alarmists use “two tricks” to back up claims of accelerating sea level rise:

1) They splice the satellite record, which only started in 1993, onto the tidal gauge records.

According to satellites, sea levels have been rising at 3.4mm/yr. Whether this figure is right or not, no half competent scientist would dream of splicing two totally different sets of data together in such a way.

Worse still, their banner figure of 3.4mm includes what is known as glacial isostatic adjustment (GIA), which accounts for the fact that the ocean basins are getting slightly larger since the end of the last glacial cycle.

In other words, if the basins were not

1) They splice the satellite record, which only started in 1993, onto the tidal gauge records.

According to satellites, sea levels have been rising at 3.4mm/yr. Whether this figure is right or not, no half competent scientist would dream of splicing two totally different sets of data together in such a way.

Worse still, their banner figure of 3.4mm includes what is known as glacial isostatic adjustment (GIA), which accounts for the fact that the ocean basins are getting slightly larger since the end of the last glacial cycle.

In other words, if the basins were not getting larger, sea levels would rise more. To account for this, they add 0.3mm a year to their sea level figures.

This is all well and good, if it were not for the fact that tidal gauges do not include such an adjustment, so the comparison of satellites and gauges becomes incompatible.

2) They compare recent sea level rise with the 20thC average.

However, sea levels were not rising at an even pace during the last century. There were times when it was rising at rates similar to today, and others, notably between 1950 and 1980 when global temperatures were falling, which saw a lower rate of rise.

As the IPCC stated in its 2013 AR5 report:

It is very likely that the mean rate of global averaged sea level rise was 1.7 [1.5 to 1.9] mm/yr between 1901 and 2010 and 3.2 [2.8 to 3.6] mm/yr between 1993 and 2010. Tide gauge and satellite altimeter data are consistent regarding the higher rate during the latter period. It is likely that similarly high rates occurred between 1920 and 1950

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So, the current rate of rise is not unprecedented, and does not “prove” that the rise will continue to accelerate. Indeed, if the 20thC record is anything to go by, it could well slow down again, as part of a natural cycle.”

Moreover a recent analysis of tide gauges, where people actually live, sea level was shown to be stable or falling at half of the locations.

via NoTricksZone http://notrickszone.com

July 15, 2017 at 09:43AM

Climate Policies Failure, the Movie

via Science Matters
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<p><a href=”http://ift.tt/2tqXndv>The Uncertainty Has Settled</a> from <a href=”http://ift.tt/2tqXnKx”>Marijn Poels</a> on <a href=”https://vimeo.com”>Vimeo</a&gt;.</p>

H/T GWPF for pointing to this documentary film on how climate change policies are threatening modern civilization.  The orginal post of this subject is below.

The Failure of Climate Policies

“Primum non nocere” means “First, Do No Harm.”

Medical practitioners know this principle, the closest approximation in the Hippocratic corpus coming from Epidemics: “The physician must be able to tell the antecedents, know the present, and foretell the future – must mediate these things, and have two special objects in view with regard to disease, namely, to do good or to do no harm.”

Every intervention has consequences by which its success is measured. Effectiveness regards the quality of outcomes: Good things happened, Nothing happened, or Bad things happened. Of course, it may be a mixed bag in which the net must be weighed.

In addition, efficiency is considered (“evidence-based” in today’s jargon): It was worth it, It was not worth it, or It was worse than doing nothing. Both attainment of intended consequences, and collateral, unintended damages bear on the judgment.

More and more in the nations “leading on climate change” people are starting to question the actions of policymakers. Recently Robert Lyman, Ottawa Energy policy analyst presented on the theme: Can Canada Survive Climate Change Policy? From Friends of Science

It must indeed seem strange that someone would wonder about the effects of the policies now proposed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as though the policies themselves are the threat. And yet they are.

I am not here to address the issue of how much human-related greenhouse gas emissions are contributing to increased concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere nor on the sensitivity of global temperatures and climate to the increases in those concentrations over time. There are others here far more qualified than I to discuss that.

Instead, I want to discuss the policy and program measures that the people of Canada and other countries, especially in the industrialized world, are being urged to adopt and what will be the implications of those policies and programs.

Canada is the second largest country in the world, sparsely populated,
with vast transportation needs. We withstand long, cold winters featuring
short days, extremely low temperatures and lots of snow. Our energy and
resource industries would be penalized for providing the valuable materials
the rest of the world demands and uses.

The article goes into the history of how we all, including Canada got to this point. Then comes this.

Ladies and gentlemen, these commitments are just the beginning, the mere “foot in the door” for the more radical demands that lie ahead. We are still bound in principle to reduce Canadian GHG emissions by 50% from 2005 levels by 2050. The U.N still wants us to “show leadership” by reducing emissions by 80% from 2010 levels by 2050. A number of environmental groups in Canada and other countries have recently endorsed the Wind, Water and Sunlight, or WWS, vision. This vision seeks completely to eliminate the use of all fossils fuels – coal, oil, and natural gas – in the world by 2050. The New Democratic Party’s LEAP Manifesto endorses this vision, as does the Green Party and most of Canada’s influential environmental organizations. The government of Ontario also has formally committed the province to this vision. So have a number of large Canadian municipal governments.

In practice, consumers pay twice, once for the (expensive) renewable
generation and then for the capital costs of the backup thermal plants.

How can we even begin to understand the magnitude of the changes being proposed? One way is to look at the sources of energy consumption and related emissions today. In 2005, Canadian emissions were 738 megatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. In 2014, after six years of the worst recession since the Great Depression, Canadians emitted less, 722 megatonnes. Twenty-six per cent of those emissions were from oil and gas production, 23 per cent were from transportation, and roughly equal portions of around 10 per cent were from electricity generation, buildings, industry and agriculture, with waste and other sources making up a residual 7 per cent. Assuming that emissions do not grow one bit over the next 32 years as a result of increased economic activity or increased population, achieving a 50 per cent emissions reduction from 2005 levels would mean reducing emissions to 369 megatonnes CO2 equivalent. That is comparable to completely eliminating the current emissions from oil and gas production, electricity generation, and all emissions-intensive industries like mining, petrochemicals, auto and parts manufacturing, iron, steel and cement. Gone. Achieving the aspirational goal of 80 per cent reduction recommended by the IPCC would mean reducing emissions to 147 megatonnes CO2 equivalent. That would be comparable to reducing Canada’s per capita emissions and our energy economy to the current levels of Bolivia, Sudan or Iraq. (original bold)

Which benefits would be achieved by incurring such costs?

Despite all the rhetoric about reducing world carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion and gas flaring, according to the U.S. Carbon dioxide information analysis center, they rose steadily from 16.6 Gigatonnes carbon dioxide equivalent in 1973 to 34.1 Gigatonnes in 2014. So, they more than doubled over that timeframe. Importantly, though, the origins of the emissions changed significantly. In 1973, the countries of the organization for economic cooperation and development, or OECD, accounted for two-thirds of global CO2 emissions from fuel combustion; by 2014, the OECD share had declined to just over a third. So all, or almost all, of the emissions growth occurred outside of the OECD.

So, we have two sharply different perspectives of the future, the EIA’s projections of what probably will happen and the aspirations of the U.N. and many environmental groups as to what in their view should happen. Reducing emissions by 50% by 2050 to meet the U.N.’s vision would mean a global total of about 16 Gigatonnes, in contrast to the EIA’s projection of 43 Gigatonnes (Gt). The OECD countries – the United States, Canada, most of Europe, Japan, Australia and others – could eliminate 100% of their projected emissions of 14 Gt, and the world would still be over its target by 13 Gt.

A Tangled Pile of Wasteful Climate Programs

There is not in Canada a comprehensive list of the measures that have been implemented by all orders of government to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. They have been increasing in number, reach and cost since 1988. I counted 37 different generic types of measures now in use. Large bureaucracies exist to design, implement, and (less frequently) evaluate these measures. They stretch like the tentacles of some vast octopus across every aspect of the Canadian economy and touch everyone’s life. As no one has ever established an inventory of the measures now in place or of those under consideration, no one knows how much these measures already cost Canadians. Two things are certain – they cost billions of dollars annually, and they are not going away soon, regardless of the taxes imposed on carbon. I might add a third certainty, which is that the government will continue to develop and implement more and more programs and regulations as time goes on.

Let me remind you of the conclusions reached by the federal government’s own monitor of program effectiveness, the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development.  Starting in 1998, the commissioner began to critique the government’s approach to managing emission reduction measures. In the seven reports that followed, there were five consistent themes.

• First, the government has not created effective governance structures for managing climate change activities. In fact, there have been weaknesses in horizontal governance across departments, accountability and coordination.
• Second, there has been, and remains, no overall implementation plan. The government has produced no estimate of the emission reductions expected from each sector. Without an implementation plan, industry, consumers and other levels of government lack a solid basis for knowing how to apply technology or make investment decisions.
• Third, as a result, Canada cannot determine whether the targets for emissions reduction already announced will be met or how much it will cost to do so.
• Fourth, there are few mechanisms in place to measure the performance of the emission-reduction measures that have been implemented so far.
• Fifth, the federal and provincial governments do poorly in coordinating their approaches to emissions reduction.

I agree that we need an honest dialogue about climate change mitigation. It should start with the recognition that governments to date have publicly embraced emission reduction targets that are unachievable with present technology and at acceptable economic costs. We should acknowledge that we as a society have multiple goals of which environmental quality, however important one might think it is, represents only one. If we value our prosperity and unity as a federal, geographically diverse country, we must approach the climate change issue with a respect for all our collective goals.

Much of Canada’s current political elite favours the pursuit of international goals over the steadfast promotion of the Canadian interest, whether on issues of trade, security or the environment. Never before, however, have we faced a situation in which commitment to an international objective may well impose enormous and divisive costs on Canada for no discernable global environmental benefit. Climate change thus offers a clear dichotomy between the Canadian national interest and the global environmental agenda.

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July 15, 2017 at 08:20AM

Focusing on worst case climate futures doesn’t work. It shouldn’t work.

via Watts Up With That?
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By Larry Kummer. From the Fabius Maximus website. Summary: After 30 years of failure to gain support of the US public for massive public policy measures to fight climate change, climate activists now double down on the tactics that have failed them for so long. This post explains why it will not work. Nor should … Continue reading Focusing on worst case climate futures doesn’t work. It shouldn’t work.

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July 15, 2017 at 08:01AM