Iran–A Case Study

By Paul Homewood

According to the US EIA, Iran holds the world’s fourth-largest proved crude oil reserves and the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves.

Not only is it a major producer of oil and gas, it is also a major consumer. According to BP, primary energy consumption was 270 Mtoe in 2016, compared to 188 Mtoe in the UK.

Oil and gas accounted for 98% of Iran’s consumption, with non-hydro renewables as little as 0.04%:

https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRN

Although Iran exports nearly two thirds of its oil output, it consumes 99% of its natural gas production in net terms. In fact it even imports small amounts from Turkmenistan, as EIA explain:

Iran’s imports of natural gas from Turkmenistan began in 1997 in response to lack of domestic infrastructure that would deliver natural gas from the south to the major consuming centers in northern Iran. Turkmenistan’s natural gas volumes filled this critical gap for years, especially during winter months.

Energy consumption has risen rapidly since 1980, as a result of industrialisation and consumer demand:

Demand for heating is particularly significant in the north of the country, where temperatures regularly dip below freezing in winter:

https://weather-and-climate.com/average-monthly-Rainfall-Temperature-Sunshine,tehran-ir,Iran

Electricity generation is also dominated by fossil fuels:

https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRN

All of which begs the question, what possible incentive does Iran have to stop using fossil fuels?

Any large scale switch away from oil and gas would in all likelihood destroy the economy and bring riots in the streets.

That is why Iran’s INDC for Paris pledged just a tiny cut of 4% in GHGs from Business As Usual (which basically means anything the Mullahs want it to mean).