I think it’s fair to say that things got off to a pretty poor start in Baku. None of the main world leaders bothered to attend – not President Biden from the USA, not President Xi from China, no Von der Leyen from the EU, no Modi from India, no Scholtz from Germany, and certainly no Putin from Russia. Even some of those who did attend were recalled by their President amid rumours that Argentina will withdraw from the Paris climate agreement. President-elect Trump almost certainly will do just that, and his recent election cast a long shadow over a jamboree that seemed much more sombre than usual, even if 66,778 people still attended.

The BBC reported that the chief executive of Azerbaijan’s COP29 team, Elnur Soltanov, discussed “investment opportunities” in the state oil and gas company with a man posing as a potential investor.

“We have a lot of gas fields that are to be developed,” he says.

Which shouldn’t really surprise anyone, given that the President of host country Azerbaijan described oil and gas as a gift from God, and the Guardian reported that over 1,700 coal, gas and oil lobbyists were granted access to COP29; furthermore that over 100 fossil fuel bosses got the red carpet treatment.

Before the conference even started, the Guardian reported that the host country was arresting journalists and climate activists in readiness for the summit which, somewhat amusingly, the Guardian then seemed to think would take place in September. The actual event (in November) brought a report from the BBC that Azerbaijan is accused of “detaining climate defenders”.

To top it all, the BBC (as well as many others) also reported that:

The United Nations’ COP climate talks are “no longer fit for purpose” and need an urgent overhaul, key experts including a former UN secretary general and former UN climate chief have said.

So much for the background. What actually happened? According to the BBC a huge deal was done (though, in fairness, that article does contain – as it should – quite a few caveats). According to the Guardian, it was a case of “Backroom deals and betrayal: how Cop29’s late $300bn deal left nobody happy. While an agreement on climate finance was eventually reached in Baku, many poorer countries were outraged”. And according to the United Nations press release: “COP29 UN Climate Conference Agrees to Triple Finance to Developing Countries, Protecting Lives and Livelihoods”, which rather implies a tremendous success. For those who are interested, the press release makes reference to some of the subsidiary topics also covered at Baku, such as carbon markets; transparent climate reporting; adaptation; gender and climate change; and civil society participation, children and youth.

However, the big deal was with regard to money. And as we know, press releases (and especially their headlines) can be misleading by perhaps seeking to put an unduly positive spin on things. Consequently, it always pays to look behind the press release to see what actually happened. Given that this COP, possibly more than ever before, was all about money (developing countries want it – lots of it – and developed countries are increasingly loath to part with it), we should look at the text (still in draft form at this stage) relating to the “agreement” relating to the “New collective quantified goal on climate finance”.

Previous COPs have produced agreements of copious length, but not the one held in Baku, despite the by now traditional dramatic end, with wailing and gnashing of teeth, walk-outs and time over-runs. This one runs to just 38 numbered paragraphs, including the ones setting the scene by referring back to earlier agreements.

After the usually introductory blurb, recalling what has gone before, particularly the Paris agreement, it starts (paragraph 1) by affirming that the new collective quantified goal on climate finance is aimed at “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels”. This is so as to reduce the risks and impact of climate change; to increase the ability to adapt to it; and to foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emission development in a manner that does not threaten food production (my emphasis – is this the first recognition that climate mitigation and/or adaptation measures might threaten food production?

Where paragraph 1 affirmed things, paragraph 2 re-affirms the outcome of the first global stocktake and stresses the urgency of action “to address the gaps in the implementation of the goals of the Paris Agreement” in this “critical decade”. So much for the “binding” Paris Agreement – there are, we are here told, gaps in the implementation of its goals.

Paragraph 3 highlights the importance of money. The needs reported in nationally determined contributions of developing country Parties are estimated at USD 5.1–6.8 trillion up until 2030 or USD 455–584 billion per year and adaptation finance needs are estimated at USD 215–387 billion annually up until 2030. It notes with concern the gap between “finance flows and needs”.

Paragraph 4 notes the findings of IPCC AR6, and that governments are key to closing the global investment gap by both public funding and clear signals to investors.

Paragraph 5 actually makes a decision. It runs to eight lines, but the gist is that the “new collective quantified goal on climate finance” will support developing countries, whether it be for adaptation, increasing ambition, or reflecting their special needs. Of course, it may be a decision, but – as is the way of COP agreements – it doesn’t actually commit anybody to anything.

Paragraph 6 is wonderful – lots of words recognising the problems developing countries face in raising money, without saying that anyone will do anything to solve them. It:

Reiterates the importance of reforming the multilateral financial architecture and underscores the need to remove barriers and address disenablers faced by developing country Parties in financing climate action, including high costs of capital, limited fiscal space, unsustainable debt levels, high transaction costs and conditionalities for accessing climate finance.

Robin Guenier’s comments on another thread, can’t be bettered by me, so I’ll slot them in here, regarding paragraphs 7, 8 and 9. These are in many ways, the nub of the agreement, if it can be said to have a nub. Paragraph 7 issues a call for “all actors” to to work together to increase climate financing from public and private sources to developing countries, so that it reaches at least USD 1.3 trillion per annum by 2035. Robin’s comment:

…‘actors’ working together, is almost completely meaningless: who are these ‘actors’? And the USD 1.3 trillion p.a. they’re supposed to find is to come ‘from all public and private sources’ – i.e. there’s no need for it to come from developed countries and certainly not from their governments. This is hugely significant: where might it come from? And then there’s the extraordinary provision that nothing has to happen until 2035 – a decade from now!

Paragraph 8 is so ineffectual as to be almost meaningless. It reaffirms Article 9 of the Paris Agreement and decides to set an additional goal, with developing countries taking the lead, of at least an extra USD 300 billion by 2035 for developing countries. The money is (a) to come from a wide variety of sources, is to be (b) in the context of meaningful and ambitious ,mitigation and adaptation and transparency in implementation [which I take as a nod to complaints that some money might otherwise be misappropriated] and (c) [this is a brilliant underminer of everything that goes before] “[r]ecognizing the voluntary intention of Parties to count all climate-related outflows from and climate-related finance mobilized by multilateral development banks towards achievement of the goal set forth in this paragraph”. As Robin says, it:

merely sets a ‘goal’ – in no sense a commitment. And the goal is that USD 300 billion a year is to be paid to developing countries (no definition of which such countries) ‘for climate action’, whatever that means. And as above nothing has to happen until 2035. Note that developed countries merely have to take a lead: what does that mean – and who is supposed to follow? Then note:

8 (a) that the funds can come from almost any source – governments need not pay a penny. (As Miliband has said.)

8 (b) that any funds will it seems only have to be paid in return for evidenced ‘ambitious’ mitigation and adaptation. That’s most significant and doesn’t seem to have been mentioned elsewhere.

8 (c) I’ve no idea what this is supposed to mean except that it seems to be another qualification of the ‘goal’.

Paragraph 9 (possibly aimed at China and others) encourages developing countries to make contributions – on a voluntary basis, of course. Robin seems to share my guess as to what this is about and suggests that it:

seems to be an answer to my who is supposed to follow question above. I think the intention is to answer criticisms that big developing emitters don’t have to contribute. If so, it’s not much of an answer.

If it’s possible, things go downhill after that. Paragraph 10 merely affirms that nothing in paragraphs 8 and 9 affects the development or recipient status of any parties (Heaven forfend!). Paragraph 11 underscores the importance of using bilateral channels, while paragraph 12 encourages parties who are shareholders in multilateral development banks to “continue advancing efforts…”. Paragraph 13 recognises the importance of various multilateral climate funds in supporting developing countries and encourages parties to work through their governing bodies to enhance climate finance. Paragraph 14 acknowledges fiscal constraints and increasing costs of adaptation and acknowledges the need for concessional finance for developing countries that are worst-affected by climate change.

Paragraph 15 “underscores the critical importance” of significantly reducing the cost of capital by 2030 and using innovative financial instruments and encourages the scaling-up of innovative sources and instruments of finance.

Paragraph 16 purports to make a decision. Not that it means anybody has to do anything to implement it. It decides that a significant increase in public resources through various mechanisms and funds and to endeavour to triple outflows from those funds from 2022 levels by 2030 at the latest. Paragraph 17 says that these scaled-up resources should aim to achieve a balance between mitigation and adaptation. Yet paragraph 18 recognises the need to dramatically scale-up adaptation finance. Is this a sign that it’s beginning to dawn on them that mitigation isn’t going to happen?

Paragraph 19 acknowledges significant gaps in responding to [alleged] increasing scale and frequency of loss and damage, and the need to avert or minimise this. Paragraph 20 recognises the importance of “just transitions” and paragraph 21 sounds like a repetition of some of the stuff earlier in the document – the need to reduce constraints etc to accessing climate finance and urging “all climate finance actors” to strengthen their efforts in this regard.

Paragraph 22 ups the ante by urging bilateral climate finance providers to apply access enhancements; but paragraph 23 reverts to type by inviting international financial institutions to carry on doing pretty much what they are currently doing. Paragraph 24 calls on multilateral climate funds to strengthen their efforts, and paragraph 25 calls on “Parties to enhance their enabling environments, in a nationally determined manner, with a view to increasing climate financing”.

By paragraph 26 we know we’re nearing the end, because it makes its usual nod to “women and girls, children and youth, persons with disabilities, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, migrants and refugees, climate-vulnerable communities and people in vulnerable situations.”

Paragraph 27 decides to launch a roadmap to try to deliver on the limited aims set out above; paragraph 28 reminds developed countries that the Paris agreement requires them to provide consistent and transparent information regarding their support for developing countries and paragraph 29 recalls the way in this information should be supplied. Paragraph 30 requests the Standing Committee on Finance to prepare a report biennially [but only commencing in 2028 – there’s no rush].

Paragraph 31 invites submissions on the information on financial support, and paragraph 32 requests that the Standing Committee on Finance take such submissions into account in assessing progress towards its belated report. Paragraph 33 recognises the importance of transparency in measuring progress, and paragraph 34 decides to undertake a special assessment of access to climate finance in 2030. Paragraph 35 invites the Standing Committee on Finance to consider in its report the regional balance in efforts to increase finance in line with paragraphs 7 and 8. Paragraph 36 decides to take stock periodically of the implementation of the decision. As Robin Guenier observes, this:

…simply emphasises the absurdity of having a 2035 goal – the only certainty about that is that the world will be an utterly different place by then.

As I noted at the outset, the whole thing is completely absurd and essentially meaningless: there’s no call for any payment before 2035 nor is anyone responsible for paying anything anyway.

Paragraph 37 takes note of the budgetary implications of all this for the secretariat. It ends with paragraph 38 requesting the secretariat to undertake the necessary actions “subject to the availability of financial resources.

In my title to this piece I described all this as a fudge, but perhaps it would be better described as desperately thin gruel. It’s time this expensive and greenhouse gas-emitting farce was put out of its misery. But of course that isn’t going to happen. Developing countries still have hopes of shaming developed countries into handing over lots of dosh (climate justice, and all that), and anyway, it’s going to be in Brazil next year. Much better than Azerbaijan, after all. What’s not to like?

(With thanks to Robin for kindly allowing me to cite his comments in full).