Every now and again, someone on either side of the climate change debate will write an article bemoaning the futility of attempting to persuade the opposition. For example, here I cover the topic from the perspective of argumentation theory. And here is someone else doing the same but from the perspective of climate contrarians are all orcs theory. That there is an unfillable chasm between the alarmed and the sceptical is an established fact generously confirmed every time their viewpoints are exchanged. The reason why there is such an impasse is also readily explained: The debate is happening across a moral divide, and there is one side that seems reluctant to entertain the possibility that the other takes morality seriously.

This asymmetry is perhaps the only notable feature separating the two camps, since in all other respects a shared experience of the human condition unifies us all. For example, we are all subject to the same cognitive biases; although to listen to the likes of John Cook, with his FLICC taxonomy of flawed reasoning, you would be forgiven for thinking the problem of bias is exclusive to the climate sceptic. In fact, this assumption of exceptionality, running counter to all that is understood regarding the nature of intuitive thinking, can only be maintained by recourse to assumptions of a moral deficit. The sceptics are deemed serial victims of damaging cognitive bias, not just because of psychological impairment, but because their intuition is presumed to lack a guiding moral compass. Their thinking may be no more motivated than anyone else’s, but they are presupposed to be motivated by base self-interest rather than anything as noble as appreciatng the integrity of the scientific method. And it gets much worse for the sceptic, because their assumed lack of respect for science is seen to result in intuitive thinking that lacks a guiding factuality.

Such presuppositions have a number of consequences when it comes to debating the issues, the most serious of which is the failure to accept that the sceptic can be taken at face value. There is always the assumption that the sceptics are not arguing in good faith, that they are bad actors, and that they are not serious when they say they want to engage. You may think that this swings both ways, but I don’t see it that way. Whilst I have often witnessed — and been involved in — online disagreements between the sceptical and the climate pessimist, I have to say the first to accuse the other of being cynical and insincere is usually the one flying the pessimistic flag. Yes, the sceptic can be as uncharitable as the next man, but the accusation of bad faith argumentation does seem to be a favourite rhetorical tool of the sceptic’s antagonist.

Take, for example, my recent experience posting an article at Judith Curry’s site to cover the vexatious question of prosocial censorship. The article had previously been posted on Cliscep but, as is to be expected nowadays, it drew little widespread attention. The same cannot be said regarding its reposting. In particular, Professor Ken Rice was moved to post a response on his own website. He says of my own effort:

One issue I have with many who promote the idea of there being some kind of scientific censorship is that it often seems to be more aimed at deligitimising those who criticise people they agree with, than a genuine attempt to engage in a serious discussion about a complex topic. There’s also an element of irony; essentially trying to censor supposedly censorious people. The post that triggered this seems to mostly fall into this latter category. There are various examples of supposed prosocial censorship without any attempt to address any nuance.

This idea that I had made no ‘genuine’ attempt to seriously discuss a complex topic was echoed by one of those who commented against the Judith Curry article. Again, the problem seemed to be my lack of good faith:

I see no problem whatsoever with good faith and level-headed about discussions [sic] the pros and cons and reasonable boundaries of phenomena like self-censorship. In fact. I think it’s absolutely an interesting subject for serious discussion. But I see no reason to take it seriously when people seek merely to game these phenomena to push their ideological agendas.

As is the case with Professor Rice, the accusation is cloaked in a faux equanimity that is only possible when speaking from an assumed position of superior contemplation and morality:

I’m generally in favor of open expression of a diversity of views. I have been so as long as I have thought about these issues. I think that generally, society benefits from a balanced diversity. But I see a lot of what I consider unserious focus on that issue, where effectively the issue is leveraged for people to push ideological agendas.

Once more, it is the examples I had chosen to illustrate prosocial censorship that apparently betray my ulterior motivation:

One place to start might be if you consider the list of examples you referenced – each clearly intended to focus only on one side of the issue. It seemed to me no more, really, than a rhetorical flex of the muscles, not a real engagement.

However, all this talk of ‘unserious focus’ and lack of ‘real engagement’ is as nothing compared to this ATTP commenter who decided to go full orc-slayer on me:

Holy crap, that post by John Ridgway (cliscep.com/author/johnridgway4/) on Curry’s blog is nasty. If we didn’t know by his link what axe he’s grinding, we soon get the picture from his words. OMG, the smug truculence, the quote-mining, butthurt-victim-playing, false-equating, — whoa, gotta pace myself! If anyone deserves the pejorative label science denier, IMHO, it’s him. I for one would fully support a little anti-sociopathic censorship in his case.

More tea vicar?

I have to say that I am actually quite impressed by the almost superhuman perception these individuals have, enabling them to discern my true motives. Ostensibly, I had simply highlighted the existence of prosocial censorship and cited a paper that revealed just how prevalent it was within academia. Could it be that I have seriously considered the risk that prosocial censorship may result in intellectual monocultures within academia? By choosing the examples I had, could it be that I was simply anxious to use those that are most topical and most representative of the phenomenon? And was the lack of detailed exploration of my examples motivated by nothing more than a desire to avoid cluttering the article with unnecessary detail? No, apparently all I was doing was playing the victim card and indulging in a ‘rhetorical flex of the muscles’. From the dismissive Professor Rice through to the vitriol of the Orc-Slayer General, there is just a withering disdain coming from those who cannot entertain the possibility that I am just as earnest and as morally motivated as themselves.

The climate change debate surrounds the taking of decisions under uncertainty. The stakes are high and the issues, although informed by scientific enquiry, are still highly value-laden. It is no wonder, therefore, that the debate requires a moral framework. But morality is pluralistic; it isn’t a matter of black and white. Adopting a monochrome approach to morally complex issues is like trying to watch snooker in black and white*. So if you ever catch yourself thinking ‘we are the good guys here, and these sceptics are not acting in good faith’, then you need to sit back and reflect. What you may see as a reluctance to seriously engage may simply be a reflection of your own inability to see beyond personal prejudices.

* The full quote for the occasion is, “For those watching in black and white, the pink is next to the green“, Ted Lowe, BBC commentator.