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William Buckley on Liberals’ Facts Avoidance Habit

William Buckley on Liberals’ Facts Avoidance Habit

via Defeat Climate Alarmism
https://defyccc.com

Some things don’t change. Buckley Jr., William. Up From Liberalism (1959):

“A second marked characteristic of the Liberal in debate with the conservative is the tacit premise that debate is ridiculous because there is nothing whatever to debate about . Arguments based on fact are especially to be avoided. Many people shrink from arguments over facts because facts are tedious , because they require a formal familiarity with the subject under discussion , and because they can be ideologically dislocative . Many Liberals accept their opinions , ideas , and evaluations as others accept revealed truths , and the facts are presumed to conform to the doctrines , as any dutiful fact will ; so why discuss the fact?” (Kindle Locations 522-527).

I think that anybody who attempted to engage a Liberal in a climate debate would wholeheartedly endorse this statement. 

“In dismissing a conservative’s contentions, it is not enough merely to say that the matter under ‘discussion’ is closed; it is usually necessary, for the sake of discipline, to berate the person who brought the matter up.” (Kindle Locations 527-529).

This observation is obsolete today.  Modern “Liberals” are much lower than their namesakes sixty years ago.  They feel necessary to smear their opponents, and, occasionally, to threaten or to call for actions against them.  From the Foreword:

“The ‘libera’ mentality which Mr . Buckley puts over a barrel in this book is , I am beginning to suspect, the ideological camouflage of the will to power of this new ruling class. I can’t find any other explanation of these fits of hysteria, these fixations which time will prove to have been irrational, some of which are so amusingly documented in this book. The Communists are excellent propagandists who have developed an uncanny skill in putting their words in other people’s mouths , but they are not that good.” (Foreword by John Dos Passos, Kindle Locations 111-114)

via Defeat Climate Alarmism https://defyccc.com

June 10, 2017 at 12:23AM

Neutralizing misinformation through inoculation: the conclusion that could not be a conclusion

Neutralizing misinformation through inoculation: the conclusion that could not be a conclusion

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This is already the third post on the “Neutralizing misinformation through inoculation” paper of Cook, Lewandowsky and Ecker (2017). This post will focus on one paragraph in the general conclusions of this paper (my emphasis):

The ongoing focus on questioning the consensus, in concert with the gateway belief status of perceived consensus, underscores the importance of communicating the consensus [68,69]. However, positive consensus messaging is not sufficient, given recent findings that misinformation can undermine positive information about climate change [33,56]. As a complement to positive messages, inoculation interventions are an effective way to neutralize the influence of misinformation.

Although this is a nice sounding conclusion, I have one problem with it: these could never ever be one of the conclusions that can be drawn from these two experiments described in the paper…

Experiment 1 looked at misinformation in the form of “false balance media coverage” and claimed that “the greatest effects were seen in perceived consensus” and were discussed on basis of that variable. As described in previous post, these were the findings (in ascending order of perceived consensus in a scale of 0 → 100):

,

Group Perceived consensus (mean)
Misinformation only 63.5
Control 68.9
Inoculation + Misinformation 70.0
Consensus + inoculation + Misinformation 83.9
Consensus + Misinformation 86.1

If we only look at that data, then I think we can conclude that:

  • The misinformation only message has a negative effect on the perceived consensus (which makes sense)
  • The consensus only message did just fine on its own (it showed the highest value of perceived consensus of all groups)
  • When a consensus message was combined with an inoculation message, it did a bit less well (but still high and the difference with a consensus only message could well be not significant)
  • The inoculation only message did remarkably worse than the consensus only message or the combined consensus/inoculation message (it was only marginally better than the control group – also here, that difference could well be not significant)

So, I am not really sure how they could reach the conclusion that a “positive consensus messaging is not sufficient” or “as a complement to positive messages, inoculation interventions are an effective way to neutralize the influence of misinformation” from the results of experiment 1. According to their own findings on false balance media coverage, the consensus message is more than sufficient and an inoculation message is found not to be necessary (or could even affect the consensus message negatively, depending whether the difference is significant or not).

I didn’t write about experiment 2 yet. In short, it investigated the misinformation in the form of “fake experts casting”. In this experiment the participants were split up into four groups: control, misinformation only, inoculation only and inoculation + misinformation. The results from the dependent variables were not found to be significant or only marginally significant. For example, if we want to compare with the results from experiment 1, the perceived consensus values looked like this (in ascending order of perceived consensus in a scale of 0 → 100):

Group Perceived consensus (mean)
Misinformation only 44.5
Inoculation only 50.4
Inoculation + Misinformation 51.6
Control 54.5

If we just compare with the previous experiment, it is clear that inoculation is hardly effective (the perceived consensus situated below the control group, somewhere in the middle of the misinformation group and the control group).

How did they then demonstrated the neutralization by inoculation in experiment 2? They managed to extract from the data that the misinformation had a polarizing effect on “climate attitudes” (people with low free-market support increased “climate acceptance”, while people with high free-market support decreased “climate acceptance”) and that inoculation apparently neutralized this effect. The inoculation + misinformation group showed “slightly less” polarization than the control group, demonstrating that the polarizing influence of misinformation was neutralized by the inoculation.

Whatever the case might be, it is clear that there was no group in which the participants received the consensus only message, nor was there a group that got a combined inoculation + consensus message, so no conclusions could be drawn about these two aspects on basis of the results of experiment 2 either.

These two statements are most probably the conclusions of the two referenced papers (numbered 33 and 56), but it could never be one of the conclusions of the “neutralizing misinformation through inoculation” paper. I would expect such statements in a “caveat” section or in the “discussion” section with the appropriate mention that this was not found in this paper, but they were put in the “conclusions” section of the paper, without even mentioning that this paper didn’t confirm the findings of those two referenced papers.

Concluding, unless I understood something completely wrong, the statements that a “positive consensus messaging is not sufficient” and “as a complement to positive messages, inoculation interventions are an effective way to neutralize the influence of misinformation” could never be one of the conclusions of this paper. After all, experiment 1 showed that the:

  1. consensus message on its own is more than enough (it performed best of all groups)
  2. combined inoculation + consensus message did not perform better than the consensus message alone (maybe even a tad less)

and experiment 2 didn’t research these two aspects at all.

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June 9, 2017 at 11:24PM

From the Scientific Urban Legend Department: Slight Rise in Temperatures Tied to Heat Wave Deaths

From the Scientific Urban Legend Department: Slight Rise in Temperatures Tied to Heat Wave Deaths

via Watts Up With That?
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Guest Essay by Kip Hansen

 

feature_image_sm

 

The Claim:

The venerable NY Times carries this headline:  “In India, Slight Rise in Temperatures Is Tied to Heat Wave Deaths”.

The study cited makes this conclusion:

“Mean temperatures across India have risen by more than 0.5°C over this period, with statistically significant increases in heat waves. Using a novel probabilistic model, we further show that the increase in summer mean temperatures in India over this period corresponds to a 146% increase in the probability of heat-related mortality events of more than 100 people.”

Rating:

rating_image

Heat waves can be killers. More Heatwaves = More Deaths.  Longer Heatwaves = More Deaths.  Heat waves are prolonged periods of excessively hot weather, which may be accompanied by high humidity, especially in oceanic climate countries.  Heat waves tend to carry off the old, infirm, and vulnerable young ….(there is more, but you have to wait for it).bbb

The rest of the study, the story and the claims are the result of questionable statistics, which even the study authors admit (or brag) are “novel”.

The whole case can be made using nothing but the study’s figures:

F1.large

The authors insist “Figure 1A shows that summer mean temperatures have increased substantially from 1960 to 2009. The time series exhibits a statistically significant (95% confidence interval) upward trend confirmed using the Mann-Kendall (MK) trend test. The accumulated intensity, count, duration, and days of Indian heat waves have also increased over the analyzed time period over most of the country and especially in the northern, southern, and western parts of India (Fig. 1, B to E).”

Temperatures increased substantially if we look at a National Average (mean) — the actual increase in the National Mean Summer Temperature trend is from 27.55  to 27.9, an increase of 0.35 °C  )  or 0.63 °F.  (Note:  not the claimed 0.5 °C, which is a rounded up exaggeration)    In the fifty (50) years of the data set, this gives an increase of 0.07°C/decade.  This increase we will simply have to accept as valid, though we must point out that the National Average Summertime Surface Air Temperature may not be the best metric to use to judge what are obviously very localized heat wave events, according to the sub-panels B thru E, and may be skewed by UHI effects in India’s massively huge urban centers.  India is huge and geographically diverse —  from the tropical southern provinces to high Himalayan plateaus  —  making a “national” average temperature meaningless in this context.

The rest of the story is contained in these two excerpts from Figures 2, 3 and 4:

combined_2-&-3_annote

The primary feature of these two graphs is that they are long-term flat, with a couple of spikes and dips.

Look back up at the National Average Temperature graph — it shows a particularly low national temperature in 1971, which shows up the these two graphs as extremely low population-weighted and income weighted heat wave deaths. And we see the existence of two (possibly three) unusually high years, 1997 and 2003.

Here’s where the “novel” statistics takes place:

F4.large

Panel C shows what we expect — The more heat wave days, the higher the average temperature.

Panel B likewise is as we would expect — longer heat waves are more likely to produce more deaths.

Panel A however, compares a probability density of Mean Summer temperature of 27°C  and 27.5°C .

Look at the original temperature graph one more time, where do 27°C  and 27.5°C  appear:

national_av_temp_final

The apparent novel statistics involves comparing the data of a low temperature year, like  1971, (very near 27°C) — not with the most recent period, not the most recent decade, not the high temp end of the graph — with  27.5°C which appears at the beginning of the time series, in 1960 and looks like the approximate average low limit  for the data set.

I am, admittedly, confused by this selection of temperatures for the probability densities in Fig 4A — but it appears to have been chosen to “prove” the hypothesis of the effect of a  0.5°C rise in temperatures.  Where could they have gotten death data for 27°C ?  Not even a single year in the 50 year time series has national average temperatures that low.   Neither the full published journal paper nor the Supplementary Materials  the contain any explanation for the choice of temperatures in the Figure 4 probability distributions, however the SM have results different (by several percentage points) from those in the published paper [see fig. S6. Results of a conditional probability density analysis of mortality given certain thresholds for summer maximum temperatures].

The two Deaths graphs above reveal the more scientifically correct findings of the study, which do come to light in the whole journal article, but are not highlighted in the Abstract, the Press Release, or the MSM.  Quoting from the paper:

 “In an effort to understand the underlying mechanisms of heat wave mortality, we further explored its relationship with population and income levels in India. Figure 3 shows that the relationship between population-weighted heat wave days and mortality rates is only slightly better than that between mortality and summer mean temperatures …; however, the correlation between income-weighted heat wave days and mortality rates is better….”

“These observations reinforce previous work that highlighted poverty as a significant factor in climate-induced mortality, such as heat wave deaths..”

 

The Bottom Line:

The nugget of truth:  Heat waves can be killers.  Heat waves tend to carry off  the poor, especially the poor elderly, the poor infirm, the poor vulnerable young.

But, primarily, it is Poverty that kills.  It kills the old, it kills the infirm, it kills the very young, it kills the weak.

Any stressor,  be it heat waves, cold snaps, drought, political instability, inflation, armed conflict  or price increases of basic food staples will cause spikes in deaths, especially among the poor — and the poor in India are very, very poor.

We really didn’t need another study to tell us that — and the use of “novel statistical methods” [stretching the truth] in an attempt to claim that “moderate increases in mean temperatures may cause great increases in heat-related mortality” does not contribute to the sum of human knowledge.

If we want to save lives, to decrease the threat of changing climatic conditions, we need to fight poverty — at the household level where real people live.

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Author’s Comment Policy:

I’d be glad to answer your questions and respond to your comments.

I am not an expert in climate science — so I don’t respond to Climate Warrior salvos from either side of the great divide.

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June 9, 2017 at 10:54PM

WHAT DID THE PARTIES SAY ON ENERGY POLICY IN THE UK ELECTION?

WHAT DID THE PARTIES SAY ON ENERGY POLICY IN THE UK ELECTION?

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This post reminds us of the policies of the UK political parties put before the people on Thursday. Of course these will have had little direct impact on the result, but it gives an idea of where the main parties stand. Unfortunately only UKIP has a really sound policy and they have no influence at all, however the Conservatives are at least better than Labour and in reality they are not really in favour of the awful Climate Change Act and many members of it would repeal it tomorrow if it were politically possible, but they fear the so-called consensus.

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June 9, 2017 at 10:39PM