From the MANHATTAN CONTRARIAN

Francis Menton

We are now in the last hours of the Biden Administration. Today the Bidenauts complete four full years in office. And as we all know, their number one priority from the day they took office was to address what they called the “climate crisis” (or sometimes, the “profound climate crisis”). Famously, after lavishly promising on the campaign trail to address and solve the crisis, newly-installed President Biden then issued multiple Executive Orders on the subject in his early days in office, most notably this one from January 27, 2021. He promised an “all of government” approach, with every department and agency explicitly tasked to make addressing the climate crisis central to their mission. In the following years, Biden proposed and then pushed through Congress legislation containing hundreds of billions of dollars worth of subsidies and tax benefits for so-called “renewable energy,” said to be the solution to the climate crisis through replacing carbon-emitting fossil fuels with clean and green wind and solar substitutes.

To remind you of the level of the promises that were made, consider the preamble of that January 2021 EO, which had the title “Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad”:

The United States and the world face a profound climate crisis.  We have a narrow moment to pursue action at home and abroad in order to avoid the most catastrophic impacts of that crisis and to seize the opportunity that tackling climate change presents.  Domestic action must go hand in hand with United States international leadership, aimed at significantly enhancing global action.  Together, we must listen to science and meet the moment.

With Biden now leaving office, this is an appropriate moment to take a look at exactly what “progress” has been made toward the promised reductions in emissions. The answer is, any emissions reductions have been so tiny as to be almost imperceptible.

In the big picture, whatever emission reduction have been achieved have mostly resulted from substitution of natural gas for coal in electricity generation. This substitution would likely have occurred by natural market processes without any of the government subsidies and credits for wind and solar power.

To help us in our review, the federal Energy Information Administration (EIA) puts out monthly data on energy production and consumption in the U.S. These data have been updated through September 2024. The EIA data on “primary energy” can be found at this link, and the data on electricity generation and consumption at this link.

Primary Energy

The term “primary energy” refers to all energy used in the economy in all sectors — not just electricity, but also transportation (cars, trucks, trains, planes), industry, agriculture, buildings, and everything else. In other words, this is the full picture.

Go to Table 1.1 at the primary energy link for the “Primary Energy Overview.” Here we find that in 2020 — the last year of the prior Trump administration — the U.S. consumed a total of 88,872 Quadrillion Btus of primary energy, of which 73,169 QBtus from fossil fuels, 8,251 QBtus from nuclear, and 7,290 QBtus from “renewable energy.” (Note that the “renewable” category is not just wind and solar, but also includes things like biomass and geothermal.). Anyway, doing some simple division, that would make 82.3% from fossil fuels, 9.3% from nuclear, and 8.3% from renewables.

The last full year of data are for 2023. Total primary energy consumption was 93,691 QBtus, of which 77,271 QBtus came from fossil fuels, 8,099 QBtus from nuclear, and 8,256 from renewables. The percentages are then 82.5% from fossil fuels, 8.6% from nuclear, and 8.8% from renewables. (Percentages may not add up to exactly 100% due to rounding.). The percent from fossil fuels actually increased slightly from 2020.

Only nine months of data are available for 2024, but those show little change in relative shares: 70,345 QBtus total primary energy consumption, of which 57,662 from fossil fuels, 6,168 QBtus from nuclear, and 6,478 QBtus from renewables. Thus 82.0% from fossil fuels, 8.8% from nuclear, and 9.2% from renewables.

With all the endless hype about the climate crisis and the hundreds of billions of dollars of federal largesse going into forcing an “energy transition,” would you ever have believed that these numbers would have moved so negligibly?

Electricity generation

The data on electricity generation by source are found in Table 7.2a at the electricity data link above. This time the data are not so helpfully grouped as in the last table, so some addition is necessary to get useful categories for our purposes. Fossil fuels are broken down into coal, oil, natural gas, and “other fossil fuels.” “Renewables” include not just solar and wind, but also “hydro,” and “wood, waste, and geothermal” (WWG), which are larger categories than you might think.

For 2020, the total generation is 4,009 terawatt hours, of which the fossil fuel categories add to 2,429 TWh, nuclear is 790 TWh, and the renewables total the remaining 790 TWh. But of the renewables, wind is 338 TWh, solar is 89 TWh, hydro is 280 TWh (net of some losses on pumped storage), and the remaining WWG renewables come to 70 TWh. So the percentages are 60.6% fossil fuels, 19.7% nuclear, 7.0% hydro, 1.7% WWG, 8.4% wind, and 2.2% solar.

Fast forward to 2023, and we find 4,183 TWh of total generation, of which 2509 TWh came from fossil fuels, 774 TWh from nuclear, 239 from hydro, 64 TWh from WWG, 166 TWh from solar, and 421 from wind. So now the percentages are 60.0% fossil fuels, 18.5% nuclear, 5.7% hydro, 10.0% from wind, 4.0% from solar, 1.5% from WWG.

Again, could you have imagined that the needle could possibly have moved so insignificantly? With all the vast subsidies and investments thrown at wind and solar, their percentage of the mix has just gone from 10.6% to 14% in three years, while fossil fuels have gone down from 60.6% to 60.0%, less than a 1% change.

For the first nine months of 2024, fossil fuels generated 59.5% of electricity, while wind generated 10.1% and solar generated 5.2%. Despite the billions upon billions of taxpayer subsidies, they creep upwards at an almost imperceptible pace.

Emissions

And has all the money lavished on buildout of wind and solar generators had any noticeable impact on carbon emissions? The two EIA pages linked above don’t have information on emissions, but here is another page with some useful information on that subject, titled “U.S. Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 2023.” Excerpt:

CO2 emissions from the electric power sector declined by 7% (115 MMmt) in 2023, making up 85% of net energy-related CO2 emissions reductions observed over the year. The reduction was due to both a slight decrease in electricity demand, which fell by around 1% in 2023, and a significant decrease in coal-fired electricity generation caused by reduced coal-fired generating capacity prompted by competition with other generation sources. Electric power generation from coal fell by 19%, or 155 terawatthours (TWh), in 2023. Most of this generation was displaced by natural gas which increased by 7% (113 TWh) and by solar which increased by 14% (21 TWh). Because coal-fired generation emits more CO2 per kilowatthour than natural gas when combusted, replacing coal-fired with natural gas-fired generation reduces CO2 emissions overall.

Thus by far most of the retired coal generation was replaced by natural gas, and a small percentage by solar.

In summary, in four years the Biden administration made almost no progress in reducing “emissions,” other than a small amount of reductions that came from substituting natural gas for coal in the production of electricity. That substitution came about through market forces (i.e., low natural gas prices) and was not even the subject of the vast energy transition subsidies made available by the government. Although renewables made some small inroads in electricity production, the increase in their share in primary energy production over the four Biden years was barely noticeable (less than 1%).

The attempt to transition our energy system via command from central planners has been one of the greatest wastes of taxpayer funds ever perpetrated by the government. It cannot be ended soon enough.

I’m a little late with this, because so much else has been going on , what with the Climate and Nature Bill, the LA wildfires, and the re-election of President Trump. However, on 6^th January, the Guardian produced an article with the following extremely worrying heading and sub-heading: “Climate crisis ‘wreaking havoc’ on Earth’s water cycle, report finds -Global heating is supercharging storms, floods and droughts, affecting entire ecosystems and billions of people”. This in turn is based on a 2024 summary report “produced by an international team of researchers from universities in Australia, Saudi Arabia, China, Germany and elsewhere”. Or, as Global Water Monitor describe themselves:

We are a consortium of several organisations and individuals that share the goal of providing free, rapid and global information on climate and water resources. Over the years, the partners have developed methods to combine and interpret water measurements made at ground stations and by satellites orbiting the Earth. They use these to produce up-to-date information on rainfall, air temperature and humidity, soil water, river flows and the volume of water bodies.

In 2022, they teamed up to provide comprehensive climate and water information via the Global Water Monitor. The online data explorer unlocks an extraordinary trove of climate and water data to anyone interested at no cost. The development of the Monitor made it possible to report on the state of our global water resources within a few days or weeks of the event. We produced a first annual report on 2022 to demonstrate that capacity.

Great stuff. Happily the report allows its contents to be copied and redistributed, so long as the following acknnowedgement is made (so here it is, with thanks): “Licensed by the Global Water Monitor Consortium under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence.”

Let’s start with the Guardian take on the report. I won’t labour the point, because you can (and I suggest should) read it for yourself. It’s full of the usual stuff – hottest year on record, water disasters killed at least 8,700 people, 40 million driven from their homes, economic damage of more than £445 billion. Deadly flash floods in Nepal and Brazil, devastating river flooding in central Europe, China and Bangladesh. Super Typhoon Yagi and Storm Boris. Droughts, adversely affected crop production in southern Africa, food shortages, culled livestock, blackouts caused by the falure of hydro power dams. And it’s all part of a trend that’s only going to get worse as greenhouse gas emissions rise. Spain, Brazil, Afghanistan, Pakistan, all are part of the ongoing roll call of doom. Reamarkably, perhaps, the article ends with a call for adaptation – which is what we sceptics have been calling for instead of futile attempts at mitigation, for as long as I can remember.

What of the report itself?

Summary

The summary on page 4 does, in fairness, contain its fair share of doom and gloom, but the bits that the Guardian chose to overlook include these little rays of sunshine:

…globally, the number of frost days over land was the lowest on record.

Vegetation condition was the highest since 2001, continuing a steady increase.

Surface water extent over land was close to average.

Terrestrial water storage [a curate’s egg] – underground and in surface water, ice and snow combined − showed ongoing low values in 2024 in most of the world’s dry regions but strong increases in western, Central and Eastern Africa.

Methodology

This is set out transparently, but as a non-scientist who doesn’t understand these things, I am less than convinced by aspects of it. It includes extimates, interpretation, and “River flows are estimated by automated measurement of river width in satellite imagery”. Similarly, “Lake and reservoir volume is estimated by combining satellite measurements of surface water level and extent with topography”. So far as concerns terrestrial water storage, “[m]issing data were imputed using a deeplearning approach”. In fairness, the limitations (which aren’t mentioned in the Guardian shock jock version of the report) are clearly set out, and I would suggest they are substantial:

If there are no gaps in the data, averages across countries or catchments can be calculated directly. If there are some missing data, they can be estimated. However, if most data are missing, calculated averages can be misleading.

Summarising storage in lakes by country or basin is straightforward in principle, as they can be added up. However, not all water bodies are measured all the time, and gaps in the data need to be estimated.

Summarising river flows by country or catchment is challenging. For example, many countries contain multiple rivers. We selected the fifteen river observation locations with the largest long-term average flows within the country or catchment and calculated a weighted average value. By its very nature, averaging over years and regions can hide locally severe conditions or extreme events that occur over short periods. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the information.

Satellite instruments can provide a near-immediate global overview of climate and water conditions, but they have uncertainties. Where available, onsite observations are usually more accurate and necessary to calibrate remote sensing approaches like those used here. Protecting and expanding the remaining water measurement station network should be a priority.

Record length, frequency and spatial detail vary between data sources. For example, climate data are available from 1979, water body data from 1984, soil water data from 1991, river flow data from 2000, and terrestrial water storage data from 2002 onwards.

Even satellite observations are unavailable in some regions and at some times. For example, soil water observations are only possible if the soil is not frozen or covered with dense forest, and surface water and vegetation observations require daylight and clear skies. In the case of climate data, data gaps are filled by weather models with uncertainties of their own.

Efforts were made to confirm the interpretation of the data using background research, but the above limitations should be kept in mind when reading this report. Anyone inclined to take action based on the information presented here should first consult the relevant local or national agencies.

I believe that the short-term nature of much of the data limits the ability to make truly dramatic claims about the effects of man-made climate change. With no data covering more than a half century and some of it covering as little as a quarter of a century, then well-known historic events of great drama are not going to be reflected in the claims made. For instance, any claims about flooding in China should acknowledge that in historic terms the events of 2024 were actually extremely limited.

Is it climate change?

I have mixed feelings about this study. On the one hand, it very fairly reports the good news along with the bad, whilst also fully setting out the limitations and caveats to its findings. On the other hand, it reads as though its aim is to blame as much as possible on climate change, and it repeatedly does so in a simplistic way with limited – if any – independent analysis of its own. Even when other explanations for droughts, floods, storms etc are mentioned, it’s often (though in fairness, not always) climate change that get the blame. Here are a few examples:

Afghanistan-Pakistan: “repeated flooding”. We are told:

The severity of the floods was exacerbated by the preceding dry winter, which left soils less able to absorb sudden rainfall, amplifying the scale of runoff. Inadequate infrastructure, particularly in rural and urban drainage systems, also increased the impacts.

No mention of deforestation, though, I note. Also, no explicit reference to climate change.

South east Asia: Typhoon Yagi:

Rising sea surface temperatures, tied to climate change, played a significant role in Yagi’s rapid intensification, a pattern increasingly observed in tropical cyclones. The storm highlights the growing risk of intense typhoons in the Western Pacific, consistent with predictions of more frequent and destructive cyclones due to global warming.

Bangladesh: monsoon floods:

Rising sea surface temperatures in the Bay of Bengal contribute to higher atmospheric moisture, intensifying rainfall.

India: landslides. This is where it gets interesting. The landslides ar clearly blamed on non-climatic factors:

The region’s steep terrain and erodible geology make it inherently susceptible to landslides. However, anthropogenic factors intensified the disaster’s magnitude. Rampant deforestation, quarrying, and unregulated construction weakened already unstable slopes. In addition, poor urban planning and inadequate disaster preparedness compounded vulnerabilities.

Despite that, however, the inevitable climate change reference follows:

The Wayanad landslides are part of a broader trend of increasing landslide events across the Western Ghats, which align with climate models predicting more frequent and intense rainfall due to global warming.

South east Asia: Severe tropical storm Trani:

Prolonged rainfall combined with already saturated soils worsened Trami’s impact. The event reflects a broader pattern of extreme rainfall events driven by rising sea surface temperatures and altered atmospheric dynamics linked to global climate change. These factors contribute to slower-moving storms with higher rainfall intensity, increasing the likelihood of catastrophic flooding.

Southern Africa: worsening drought:

The drought was associated with an El Niño climate pattern but exacerbated by high temperatures intensifying evaporation rates.

East Africa: heavy flooding.

El Nino is initally blamed, but the conclusion is:

An attribution study found that the disaster was caused by a combination of climate change and rapid growth of urban areas. The experts warned that climate change is likely to lead to more frequent and severe weather extremes.

South Sudan: repeated floods.

Climate researchers suggest that altered climate patterns affecting the Sudd wetland could result in the first mass-population displacement caused by climate change, due to the permanent expansion of uninhabitable wetlands.

West and Central Africa: unprecedented (sic) monsoon rains:

Climate scientists have attributed the increased intensity of the monsson rains to human-induced climate change. Global warming has intensified seasonal downpours in the Niger and Lake Chad basins by 5–20%. Rising global temperatures increase atmospheric moisture and amplify the potential for slow-moving weather systems, resulting in more prolonged and intense rainfall events.

Central Europe: Storm Boris causes flooding:

Warmer atmospheric conditions are believed to have contributed. According to climate scientists, climate change made the record-breaking rainfall twice as likely and intensified the rains by 7−10%.

Spain: flash floods:

The disaster highlighted the increasing frequency of extreme weather events. Experts attribute the intensity of the floods to climate change. One analysis suggested that the rainfall intensity was made twice as likely by the 1.3°C of global warming experienced so far.

Southeastern USA – severe hurricane season. Interestingly, they cite no statistics to suggest that hurricanes were unusually frequent or intense, but they choose to go with the increasingly common metric of financial loss. As populations become larger and wealthier and build in less and less appropriate locations, inevitably the same weather events will cause greater financial loss, even if they are no more severe. This seems to pass researchers by, or else they turn a blind eye to that reality and find it a useful metric to turn to when the weather events themselves have not set new records. And, of course:

Rising sea surface temperatures in the Atlantic − at least partly attributable to climate change − contributed to the intensity of these storms.

Amazon basin – severe drought and bushfires:

Experts indicate global warming as the main driver of the Amazon’s worst drought in at least half a century. The combination of rising temperatures and deforestation has increased the region’s vulnerability to such events.

It’s extremely disappointing that they make no effort to ascertain the extent to which each factor is relevant.

Southern Brazil: Rio Grande do Sul floods.

They were the worst since 1941 (suggesting they were worse in 1941) and the explanation, we are told, is to be found in El Nino. Despite that, this section still concludes with the inevitable:

However, a scientific study found that climate change made the extreme rainfall causing the floods twice as likely.

Papua New Guinea – Enga landlside.

We are told that the cause of the disaster remains under investigation, and that gold mining activities may have contributed to it. Despite that, the section ends, perhaps inevitably, thus (this is my particular favourite):

Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister attributed the disaster to climate change.

Well, he would, wouldn’t he? Isn’t that the key to securing funds from the developed world?

Outlook for 2025:

Due to ongoing climate change, global temperatures are likely to increase further in 2025, leading to more heatwaves, greater bushfire risk, intense storms, and extreme rainfall events. This includes a greater likelihood of fast developing ‘flash floods’ and ‘flash droughts’ for all regions.

And now for the bits that the Guardian didn’t report.

Good news

Page 23:

The global annual average near-surface soil moisture in 2024 was 21 vol%, a slight increase of 1% more than the 1995–2005 baseline, or 2.4% in relative terms. Global average soil water conditions appear to oscillate over time. There is no statistically significant long-term trend.

Page 25:

Vegetation condition (NDVI, or normalised vegetation difference index) over the land area was 6.4% above the 2001–2005 average and the highest recorded. There has been a significant trend of vegetation condition increasing by 2.3% per decade. This trend has been attributed to a combination of increasing temperatures in cold regions, agricultural expansion, and fertilisation from increasing CO2 and other anthropogenic sources.

This is a massive story, surely? While just eight countries recorded record-low annual NDVI (Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi in Eastern Africa; Cambodia and Laos in Southeast Asia; Morocco in Northern Africa; Belize in Central America; and Iceland in Northern Europe), forty-two countries recorded record-high annual NDVI values. They included countries in Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Andorra, Italy, Albania, Slovenia, Montenegro), in Western Europe (France, Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein), and Eastern Europe (Russia, Belarus, and Slovakia). Record highs were also observed in Eastern Asia (China, Japan, Korea), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), Southern Asia (Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan) and the United Arab Emirates in Western Asia. In Eastern Africa, Ethiopia, Uganda, Djibouti, Eritrea, Seychelles, and South Sudan recorded highs, along with Mali and Niger in Western Africa, Chad in Middle Africa, and Sudan in Northern Africa. The Americas recorded record highs in Canada and Uruguay, Haiti, Cuba, and Barbados in the Caribbean. Kiribati in Micronesia also reached record highs. A further ten countries experienced unusually high NDVI values, including the USA, Kenya in Eastern Africa; Armenia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Bhutan in Asia; the Central African Republic and Cameroon in Middle Africa; and Lithuania and Latvia in Northern Europe.

Given the seemingly never-ending doom and gloom about crop yields, this seems to me to be tremendously good news, suggesting that the doom and gloom is ill-founded. This is particularly so when one looks at the river basin areas that experienced high values, many of them being areas that are regularly assumed to be problematic in terms of crop yields. Six African basins, including the Nile, Lake Chad basins, and Rift Valley, showed record highs. In Europe, five basins around the Mediterranean Sea showed record-high values, with Fiji and the Uruguay-Brazil South Atlantic Coast also reaching record highs. Eight further basins showed unusually high values, including the Horn of Africa, Lake Chad, North Arabian Interior, and Yenisei.

Page 27: Surface water occurrence. It seems there is nothing to get upset about here, either:

Year-to-year variations in surface water occurrence are dominated by the extent of large wetlands and lakes and the seasonal flooding of large rivers. The average global surface water extent in 2024 was 2.8% below the 2003–2005 average.

Surface water occurrence declined from 2008 to 2011 due to a contraction of surface water at high latitudes and has been stable since. There is an overall significant trend of surface water increasing 3.0% per decade in relative terms.

Some changes in record water occurrence can be attributed to the construction of new dams, especially in China, India and Brazil. The remainder is associated with natural floodplains, water bodies and wetlands.

Similarly (page 29): “no statistically significant trend in global river flow volumes was observed over time.”

Page 31: “In 2024, the global average volume of water stored in water bodies was 0.3% above the 1995–2005 baseline. There has been a significant upward relative trend of 0.18% per decade.”

That also sounds like good news, as does this detail:

Record-high monthly values were 9.1 times more frequent than the baseline, with a significant increasing trend of 64% per decade. Record-low monthly values in 2024 were 2.2 times more frequent than during the baseline period, but there was still a significant decreasing trend of −28% per decade.

Conclusions

The Global Water Monitor summary report for 2024 is, as I suggested above, a curate’s egg. It reports the good news along with the bad, and it fairly acknowledges its own limitations. On the other hand, it seems very keen to shoehorn climate change into the narrative as frequently as possible. Quoting the President of Papua New Guinea in an attempt to blame climate change – presumably because they could find no “experts” to do so – seems like pretty desperate stuff, and not what one expects to see in a serious scientific study.

The inevitable problem is that once a report of this nature lands on the desks of Guardian journalists, it will be cherry-picked for information that supports the climate crisis narrative. The Guardian report tells us that the report “used data from thousands of ground stations and satellites orbiting the Earth to assess critical water variables such as rainfall, soil moisture, river flows, and flooding.” Which is true, but the report also tells us that such satellite data can have uncertainties. It also listed several other caveats and limitations regarding its data sources. The Guardian fails to mention any of those caveats, instead referring to the report’s data and methodology as though they are unimpeachable.

Nowhere does the Guardian report mention any of the good news contained in the report. A Guardian reader, who relies on the newspaper only and never checks the source material, will be left with a completely misleading impression. The Guardian’s headline could have been something like “Global vegetation continues its improving trend – great news for global food production”. It could then have gone on to focus on improving vegetation conditions in parts of the planet that have often encountered food shortages and mass starvation. Inevitably, though, that was never going to happen.

At its best, the Guardian is still capable of serious analysis and diligent journalism. Unfortunately, at it’s all too frequent worst, it’s little more than a propaganda sheet akin to the Soviet Union’s Pravda. And so I will continue to check the source material that provides the Guardian’s extreme headlines and sometimes misleading articles, with a view to ensuring that the whole story is told.