An article on the BBC website this week intrigued me greatly. Headed “India’s biofuel drive is saving billions but also sparking worries”, it tells a mixed tale in connection with India’s drive to increase the ethanol mix in the petrol used by the vehicles on its roads. The saved billions alluded to in the title are dollars ($15.5 billion to be precise), representing foreign exchange saved since 2014. Presumably this is a calculation based on money saved in buying less oil and/or refined petroleum. The saving in CO2 emissions, which is the justification for the programme of blending 20% ethanol with petrol, known as E20, seems less impressive. The BBC article claims that – again since 2014 – it has resulted in the avoidance of 69.8 million tonnes of CO2 emissions. This sounds impressive, until one realises that it represents a saving of less than 7 million tonnes of CO2 per annum. The Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) tells us that in 2023 alone, India emitted 4,133.55 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent, a figure that continues to rise year on year. And whilst climate worriers would tells us that every saving, however small, is important, it has to be conceded that this represents an insignificant saving in the scheme of things.

Of course, the Indian government might be justified in going down this route if there was no downside, or if the downsides were modest compared to the gains. But is this the case? Well, the BBC article suggests that so far as Indians are concerned, the downsides are actually pretty substantial.

The first massive problem is that many vehicles in India are not E20-compliant. One might have thought that the Indian government would have taken that into account before pressing ahead with the policy, but apparently not. Critics claim that ethanol is more corrosive and has lower energy density than petrol, resulting in lower mileage and greater wear and tear on vehicle engine parts. The Indian government’s response, in the form of a press release issued earlier this month, reads to an outsider as an extremely arrogant response, reminiscent of Marie-Antoinette and “let them eat cake”:

Biofuels and Natural Gas are India’s bridge fuels. They represent a viable, non-disruptive transition towards meeting our commitments to a greener world and are in line with our Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) wherein India has signed up to Net Zero by 2070….The use of E-20 gives better acceleration, better ride quality and most importantly, lowered carbon emissions by approximately 30% as compared to E10 fuel….

Non-disruptive and most important to Indian government ministers, perhaps, but not to the mass of the Indian people. Still, when did politicians ever listen to the concerns of the people when it comes to reducing greenhouse gas emissions?

The Marie-Antoinette of the Indian government made another appearance on X:

In a post on X, the ministry said that engine tuning and E20-compatible materials could minimise the drop in mileage. It also advised replacing certain parts in older vehicles, saying the process was inexpensive and “easily done during regular servicing of the vehicle”.

It doesn’t seem to occur to them that a combination of more expensive fuel, fewer miles per gallon, and damage to engine parts, avoidable only by spending more money on adaption, aren’t what poor Indian people need or want.

“Why should I be forced to buy petrol that offers less mileage and then spend more to make the materials compliant?” he [Amit Pandhi, who has owned a Maruti Suzuki car in Delhi since 2017] asked.

Did I mention that the E20 fuel is more expensive? Ed Miliband and others in the UK Labour government claim that the UK needs renewable energy to avoid expensive fossil fuels, only to watch the price of renewable energy rise inexorably and cost more than electricity generated by fossil fuels. In India, the government claims that ethanol was cheaper than petrol when it went down this road, but now has to acknowledge that “[o]ver time, procurement price of ethanol has increased and now the weighted average price of ethanol is higher than cost of refined petrol”.

One might expect that this would give them pause for thought, and at least lead to no further work on the programme until the situation becomes clearer. But no:

India, however, is planning to go even beyond E20.

“The country will now gradually scale towards E25, E27, and E30 in a phased, calibrated manner,” Petroleum Minister Hardeep Puri said recently.

That’s despite the fact that – according to the BBC – this policy is also concerning climate researchers and food policy experts. Why might that be? Because sugar cane (currently used to produce 40%) and maize are used to produce India’s ethanol, farms are now growing crops for fuel rather than for food. Furthermore, this will only get worse, as demand for fuel for vehicles is expected to double by 2050, at which point 20 billion litres of ethanol will be needed (I assume annually, though the article doesn’t make that clear). This creates another problem. If India continues to rely on sugar cane to make ethanol, it will be relying on a water-intensive crop, or it can rely more on crops such as maize and rice (I should have thought that growing rice is pretty water-intensive activity too). Last year, as part of this shift, India became a net importer of maize for the first time. So much for the boost to India’s balance of payments by importing less oil and/or refined petroleum.

Furthermore, this use of maize means the poultry sector is having to spend more on corn for use as feedstock, while the Food Corporation of India (FCI) has allocated an unprecedented 5.2 million tons of rice for ethanol production. According to the BBC article, the FCI’s rice stocks are traditionally earmarked for the poor of India at subsidised prices. We are offered a very salient quote in this regard from a “farming sector expert”:

In a country like India, where 250 million people go hungry, we cannot use food to feed the cars.

Other downsides weren’t mentioned (at least, not in detail) in the BBC article, but given that they represent environmental problems, I would suggest that they are particularly important in the context of a policy that is being justified by reference to its supposedly positive environmental impact. The BBC article refers to research carried out by CSTEP (The Center for Study of Science, Technology and Policy), but more can be found about their research here:

This [the E20 policy] will entail about 8 million hectares of additional land for maize cultivation by 2030, equivalent to roughly a quarter of India’s total agricultural land, the think tank said.

I confess I have made no attempt to verify their analysis, since if it is even partially correct it suggests that the E20 policy is hugely problematic. For instance, it is claimed that every litre of ethanol produced from sugar cane requires the use of 2,860 litres of water. According to CSTEP, rising ethanol production would require 50 billion cubic metres of water by 2070 – as CSTEP puts it, enough water to meet Delhi’s water needs for 17 years.

It’s also worth mentioning that if India shifts to using rice for ethanol production, then as well as potentially harming India’s poor, it could result in substantial methane emissions. We are told, by WWF that rice-growing is responsible for 12% of global methane emissions and 1.5% of total greenhouse gas emissions.

Even if we assume that India’s E20 plan (to become over time an E30 plan) will make a modest reduction in CO2 emissions – let’s be generous and call it 20 million tonnes of CO2 reduction per annum by 2050 – that seems like a very modest benefit compared to the societal and environmental harms associated with the policy. And it really is a drop in the ocean when one considers India’s growing demand for coal. According to the IEA “[c]oal consumption in India is expected to grow by 2.5% in 2026”.

Meanwhile, in the UK (leading the world, remember), “Fuel plant closure ‘devastating’ for workers”.

The closure of the UK’s largest bioethanol plant is “devastating” news, regional politicians have claimed.

The closure is being blamed on the terms of the UK/US trade agreement recently negotiated by the UK government.

The government said it had taken the decision in the national interest.

So much for all those green jobs. It’s a crazy old world, right enough.

By Howard Gruenspecht

Articles addressing energy and climate topics in The New York Times (NYT) increasingly include Inaccurate data and false information. The problem is compounded by the paper’s failure to follow its own corrections policy when errors are called to its attention. 

Readers look to the NYT to deliver well-reasoned and fact-checked information and analysis in areas where they are not themselves experts. However, based on my professional focus on data and analysis of energy and related environmental issues over the past 45 years, which includes White House and Department of Energy senior positions in the Carter, Bush 41, Clinton, Bush 43, Obama, and Trump 45 administrations as well as work at leading universities and think tanks, NYT coverage of these subjects too often fails to live up to its own standards for accuracy and journalistic integrity. 

As a lifetime reader of the NYT, the frequency of errors and a refusal to fix them raises doubts regarding the accuracy of information presented on other topics. Whether or not the problem extends beyond energy and climate, the NYT readership clearly deserves better. 

Three recent NYT articles illustrate the problem: a July 22 article by Max Bearak, ostensibly reporting on remarks by UN Secretary-General Guterres’ on renewable energy; a May 26 article by Ivan Penn on competition between electric vehicles (EVs) and vehicles powered by internal combustion engine (ICEVs); and an April 23 column by David Wallace-Wells on the loss of cultural and political momentum for action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These are considered in turn below, followed by some summary conclusions. 

1. Max Bearak’s July 22 2025 article “U.S. Is Missing the Century’s ‘Greatest Economic Opportunity,’ U.N. Chief Says” (July 23 print edition).

The article opens with a review of UN Secretary-General Guterres’ remarks promoting renewable energy investment as both an economic opportunity and an environmental imperative. With deft mixing of quoted and unquoted words, Bearak reports that Guterres explicitly criticized the U.S. and other countries that follow its policies on fossil fuels. Though that may well be the Secretary-General opinion, that view is not borne out in the as-delivered transcript of his remarks.

The bulk of the article turns to a discussion of energy data and climate policy that attempts to explain why the current situation has arisen, noting that this material was “left unsaid” by Mr. Guterres. From this point forward the reporter’s own analysis seeks to establish that China, in contrast to the U.S., is constructively pursuing a green energy transition. Unfortunately, the article presents faulty and misleading data. 

In seeking to highlight China’s constructive role the article states “Over the past decade, China has gone from a largely coal-powered economy to one that is deploying more renewable energy than anywhere else.”  Growth in China’s production and deployment of a wide range of renewable energy technologies is indeed very impressive. However, data in the 2025 Statistical Review of Word Energy (a widely-respected source of energy data available online here), show that China is still largely powered by coal. In 2024 coal provided 58.1% of China’s total energy use (92.2 out of 158.9 exajoules), while in 2014 it accounted for 69.8% of China’s energy use (82.1 out of 117.6 exajoules). (FYI, 1 exajoule = 947.8 trillion British Thermal Units).Thus, coal still dominates in China’s energy mix, although coal use grew more slowly than total energy use over the past decade.   

Following its discussion of China’s renewable energy progress, the article turns to energy use and production the U.S. and other rich countries. It incorrectly states that “Relatively wealthy countries like the U.S., Canada, Australia and Saudi Arabia are also the world’s biggest producers of fossil fuels.”   Data in the 2025 Statistical Review show that China’s total production of coal, oil, and natural gas totaled 112.3 exajoules in 2024, 32% higher than that of the second leading producer, the U.S., which totaled 85.0 exajoules. Indeed, China’s production of coal (94.5 exajoules) alone exceeds the total fossil fuel production of any other country. Moreover, the 2024 data is no anomaly; China has been by far the world’s largest fossil fuel producer in every year since 2005.        

Despite having contacted the NYT corrections team and the author to point out these errors, as well as the article’s mischaracterization of the temperature-related aim of the 2015 Paris Agreement, no corrections have been made to date. 

2. Ivan Penn’s May 26 2025 article “Electric Vehicles Died a Century Ago: Could that Happen Again?”  (May 27 print edition).

The article draws a parallel between the current competition between electric vehicles (EVs) and those with internal combustion engines (ICEVs) and the competition between them at the dawn of the automobile age. According to the article “scholars who have studied the earlier age of electric vehicles see parallels in their demise in the early decades of the 1900s and the attacks they are facing now. In both eras, electric cars struggled to gain acceptance in the marketplace and were undermined by politics.” 

Actions taken since the start of the Trump Administration to eliminate EV subsidies and to modify mandates and regulations that would have forced very rapid rates of EV adoption do matter.These actions are widely expected to slow, but not stop, EV market share growth, compared to the outlook assuming a continuation of Biden-era policies. However, available data and research clearly refute the claim that the market extinction of EVs a hundred year ago can be attributed to lawmakers of that era having “put their thumbs on the scale — and coming out on the side of oil” by enacting a very generous oil depletion allowance in 1926.

The oil policy changes discussed in the article cannot have played a major role in the demise of EVs a century ago because EVs were already on their deathbed before they occurred. Data on vehicle manufacturing and registrations show that at least 98%, and possibly more than 99%, of the 17.5 million vehicles registered to operate in 1925 were already ICEVs. The article avoids recognizing that reality, which directly undercuts its line of argument. 

The Department of Energy’s History of Electric Cars paper, prepared during the Obama Administration, specifically notes that the market share of EV sales peaked in 1899 and 1900 and declined thereafter, while the absolute level of EV production peaked in 1912 and declined thereafter. The early peaking of both EV market share and production occurred against the backdrop of explosive growth in both annual vehicle sales (from 4,200 in 1900 to 181,000 in 1910 and 3.74 million in 1925) and total vehicle registrations (from 8000 in 1900 to 459,000 in 1910 to 17.5 million in 1925). The History of Electric Cars paper also identifies the four major drivers of the EV decline in the early 20^th century: improved roads, which favored ICEVs that could offer long range capability; oil discoveries in Texas that led to lower gasoline prices; the invention of the electric starter, which eliminated the need for a hand crank to start ICEVs; and mass production of ICEVs, which dramatically lowered their cost. The 1926 oil tax policy change does not make the list. Indeed, it is not even mentioned in the paper.

Federal policy can sometimes be a key driver of energy market outcomes, as has arguably been the case with the Price Anderson Act that enabled commercial nuclear power, the Natural Gas Act, and renewable fuel content mandates. That said, the fate of EVs a century ago shows that federal policies are not always a significant factor in market outcomes. Today’s EV advocates can draw solace from that point, since modern EVs have many positive attributes that should favor continued EV market share growth, and perhaps a future market-leading role, even with the recent removal of some policy stimulants.

3. David Wallace-Wells’ April 23, 2025 article, “The World Seems to Be Surrendering to Climate Change” (subsequently revised twice).

Wallace-Wells discusses the declining cultural and political momentum for ambitious action to limit greenhouse gas emissions in recent years, noting that this trend applies both domestically and globally. 

In closing, the article observes that when climate advocates reckon with the loss of cultural and political momentum they often point to green records set each year. After reviewing some of these recent records and pointing out that a staggering share of global progress is taking place in China, Wallace-Wells notes that progress in the U.S. can be similarly breathtaking. It is here that problems in both the data cited and in the NYT corrections process are clearly evident.

In describing U.S. green energy progress, the original version of the article stated that electricity generation from renewables exceeded that from fossil fuels in 2024, which is woefully incorrect. Data readily available from the U.S. Energy Information Administration website and many other sources show that renewables provided 20% of 2024 US generation compared to 60% from fossil fuels. 

The NYT did issue a correction, but the initial one it posted on April 25 claimed that monthly electricity generated by renewables in the U.S. exceeded the amount generated using fossil fuels for the first time in March. That updated claim was also wrong, as fossil generation substantially exceeded renewable generation in both March 2024 and March 2025. When this new error was called to its attention, the paper issued a further correction, still dated April 25, that now appears on its website. The final correction took an approach that is simultaneously misleading for readers and instructive regarding how hard the NYT strives to avoid issuing clear substantive corrections that may embarrass its authors or cast doubt on its preferred narratives. Rather than simply strike the original errant point or its errant replacement, which are not at all central to the main focus of the article, the second correction reframes it as a comparison between generation from clean sources and fossil fuels. The trick here is that “clean sources” evidently includes include nuclear generation, which provides roughly 20% of U.S. generation, to finally make the comparison valid. However, nuclear is not once mentioned in the article or in the final correction note, which even suggests that the original article was also comparing generation from clean sources and fossil fuels. The losers here are the general readers, who would likely assume that “clean sources” is simply a synonym for “renewables” and never know that they had been badly misled.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, I could go on – the three articles reviewed above are only examples of a larger problem that has been evident for some time. 

The NYT, which has a very deep bench of staff who specialize in energy and climate matters, including the authors of these articles, must do better. Bearak should be able to correctly identify the world’s largest fossil fuel producer and coal’s continuing role as the dominant energy source in China. Penn should be able to recognize that history does not support the notion that EV developments today are repeating, or even closely rhyming with, the history of EVs a century ago. The temptation to craft tidy morality fable or reprise the origins dubious oil depletion policy first introduced in the mid-1920s that provided a huge windfall to the oil industry does not grant a license to posit a clearly invalid parallelism. The editors overseeing these articles also bear responsibility. 

Finally, even when factual errors do slip into articles, a sound and well-implemented corrections policy can greatly mitigate the damage. The stated NYT correction policy that “when we learn of a mistake, we acknowledge it with a correction” is sound, but its current implementation is atrocious. The so-called Grey Lady of journalism should be blushing in shame. The paper quickly corrects errors that are of minor importance to most readers, such as misspelled names, incorrect job titles, or inaccurate event dates. However, when substantive factual errors are identified and reported to the paper, as in the examples discussed above, its response is to either stonewall, as in the case of the Bearak article, or to obfuscate and evade, as in its correction of the comparison of renewable and fossil fuel generation levels in the Wallace-Wells article. In the latter case, the common observation that the cover-up is often worse than the crime clearly applies.  

The NYT must always remember that the purpose of corrections is to inform the reader of what is actually true, rather than to protect its writers from embarrassment or protect preferred narratives that cannot withstand scrutiny. 

Howard Gruenspecht served in senior White House positions in the Carter and Bush 41 Administrations, in Deputy Assistant Secretary and Office Director roles in the Department of Energy policy office during the Bush 41 and Clinton Administrations, and as the Deputy Administrator (top non-political position) of the U.S. Energy Information Administration, which provides independent energy data and analysis, during the Bush 43, Obama, and Trump 45 Administrations. 

This article was originally published by RealClearEnergy and made available via RealClearWire.