What Keeps “Energy Transition” Going? $ $ $

Robert Gauthier answered posting on a Quora topic How could we reverse the damage done by the “green energy” global scam that brought less efficient and highly polluting energy producing projects and high energy prices? Excerpts in italics with my bolds and added images.

Wind and solar power has provided politicians with an excuse to dispense favours—including taxpayer-funded subsidies and tax preferences to a supposedly “green” industry—while appearing to do something for the environment. And yet, despite more than two decades of massive subsidies, tax preferences and purchasing mandates from governments, wind and solar power still represent barely more than a rounding error of global energy production. In jurisdictions where renewables enjoyed strong but ill-considered political support, consumers and taxpayers now face much higher electricity bills and less-reliable power. And despite promises to the contrary, countries such as Germany, which have significantly increased wind and solar electricity production, have seen no meaningful reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

Far from being a miracle cure-all for the shortcomings of conventional power generation, wind and solar power exaggerate the symptoms they pretend to address. Added up over the past two decades, the cumulative subsidies across the world for biofuels, wind, and solar approach about $5 trillion, all of that to supply roughly 5% of global energy.

The whole justification for the falling costs of wind generation rested on the assumption that much bigger turbines would produce more output at lower capex cost per megawatt, without the large costs of generational change. Now we have confirmation that such optimism is entirely unjustified – the whole development process has been a case of too far, too fast. Again, this was both predictable and predicted. The idea that wind turbines are immune to the factors that affect other types of power engineering was always absurd. The consequence is that both capital and operating costs for wind farms will not fall as rapidly as claimed and may not fall significantly at all. It follows that current energy policies in the West are based on foundations of sand – naïve optimism reinforced by enthusiastic lobbying divorced from engineering reality.

In the end, however, politicians cannot defy the laws of physics and economics. The promise of wind and solar power will always clash with the need for electricity that is low cost and reliable. That’s why voters routinely punish politicians who pursue flawed renewable energy policies. Rising electricity costs due to increased wind and solar power damage the economy by making businesses that consume significant volumes of electricity less competitive and by leaving less money in the pockets of consumers.

In Ontario, Canada during the run of the Green Energy Act there which attempted to replace coal and nuclear with wind and solar the upshot was a 138% increase in the price of electricity at the meter for the consumers. This led to the government that brought in this legislation to lose the next election so badly that they were no longer recognized as a party in the legislature. Naturally the government that replaced them killed the program and started refurbishing the nuclear reactor fleet there.

Unfortunately, solar and wind technologies require huge amounts of land to deliver relatively small amounts of energy, disrupting natural habitats. The real estate that wind and solar energy demand led the Nature Conservancy to issue a report last year critical of “energy sprawl,” including tens of thousands of miles of high-voltage transmission lines needed to carry electricity from wind and solar installations to distant cities.

Land required for wind farms to power London UK

Building a single 100-MW wind farm—never mind thousands of them—requires some 30,000 tons of iron ore and 50,000 tons of concrete, as well as 900 tons of nonrecyclable plastics for the huge blades. With solar hardware, the tonnage in cement, steel, and glass is 150% greater than for wind, for the same energy output

Take batteries. It is estimated that current battery manufacturing capabilities will need to be in the order of 500-700 times bigger than now to support an all-electric global transport system. The materials needed just to allow the UK to transition to all electric transport involve amounts of materials equal to 200% the annual global production of cobalt, 75% of lithium carbonate, 100% of neodymium and 50% of copper. Scaling by a factor of 50 for world transport, and you see what is now a showstopper. The materials demands just for batteries are beyond known reserves.

And that’s just one of the issues. Others include vast costs constituting a multiple of current energy costs; the environmental impact of mining and transporting huge amounts of materials; need for vast amounts of rare elements, far beyond known world reserves; incredibly huge amounts of material to recycle when facilities wear out; and on and on.

Spend enough time researching this stuff and you gradually realize that almost everything you read about green energy shows that at best it’s really a dark shade of brown.

via Science Matters

https://ift.tt/dZWqiro

December 31, 2024 at 02:48PM

Seventh Hell

The prospect of the Climate and Nature Bill being passed into law has prompted discussion of its implications, both at Cliscep (here and here), and also at Paul Homewood’s site. However, grim though the implications of the Bill are, things are quite bad enough already.

Today’s Guardian features an article whose title and sub-title alone make it clear that the ongoing effects of the Climate Change Act (CCA) aren’t about to go away, and those effects will include massive changes to our way of life: “Starmer faces test of climate leadership with big decisions on carbon budget – PM will have to respond to Climate Change Committee’s recommendations on future emissions cuts with drastic changes in many sectors of economy” Specifically, it reminds us that the Climate Change Committee (CCC):

will set out recommendations on the UK’s seventh carbon budget on 26 February. At the core of the budget will be an overall cap on emissions for the years 2038 to 2042, needed to meet the legal obligation of reaching net zero emissions in 2050.

What’s the urgency, you might ask? Well, the problem is that we in the UK are already slipping behind the targets, and if we are to achieve net zero by 2050, as mandated by the CCA, then policies must be implemented sooner rather than later. The article reminds us that thanks to the Prime Minister’s grandstanding in Baku and the pledge he then made, the UK will need to have reduced emissions from 1990 levels by 81% by 2035. Mind you, given how lightly the PM regards pledges, perhaps we shouldn’t worry too much about his world stage posturing. On the other hand, the Cabinet does seem to be stuffed full of climate and net zero zealots (as do the government back benches, if support for the Climate and Nature Bill is any guide), so maybe we should be concerned after all. And it gets worse – according to the Guardian, the seventh carbon budget, to be issued by the CCC, will need to go further still: “by 2040, emissions should be about a quarter of what they are today.”

Naturally, the Guardian is all in favour, and rolls out talking heads to tell us there’s nothing here to frighten the horses. According to Ed Matthew, campaigns director at the E3G thinktank:

It is the opportunity to put the finishing touches to a project to rewire the UK economy, to make it globally competitive and help nature to flourish. The only question is whether our leaders have the courage to be ambitious and stand up to the vested interests standing in our way.

The only question? I appreciate that we all see the world in our individual ways, but I think there might be a few other questions too – such as, is this affordable? Is it sensible? Will it achieve anything positive? Is it practicable? Will it damage the economy, our manufacturing sector, our way of life?

Even the Guardian acknowledges that it is in fact a big deal. It notes that it will require not only the decarbonisation of the power sector, but also drastic (the Guardian’s word – not mine, though I agree) changes in many other sectors of the economy. EVs must replace ICE vehicles; a widespread of public transport will be required (by which I infer that far fewer people will be allowed to have – or perhaps be able to afford – private vehicles); homes must be insulated (despite the issues?) and gas boilers exchanged for heat pumps (despite the problems); big changes will be needed to farming practices; new techniques for industry (a casually thrown-out phrase, with massive implications); and tree-planting and nature programmes must “restore carbon sinks”.

The Guardian rightly observes that both the Prime Minister and Mr Miliband have very prominently, on the world stage, claimed “global climate leadership” for the UK, so it will be difficult for them to depart from CCC advice. Worryingly (to me, and I suggest, to anyone who cares about this country’s future) an automaton at the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero has been approached for a quote and duly parroted the official mantra:

Britain is back in the business of climate leadership because the only way to protect current generations in the UK is by making Britain a clean energy superpower, and the only way to protect our children and future generations is by leading global climate action. We look forward to receiving the CCC’s expert advice and we will set our seventh carbon budget by June 2026, in line with our statutory duties.

Even Guardian journalists have an inkling that this stuff isn’t going to be easy, whatever the spin climate evangelists put on it. The article points out that the first three carbon budgets were relatively easy to meet, as simply shifting from coal to gas and throwing lots of money at – sorry, investing in – offshore wind was a quick and easy way to reduce emissions (but never mind the price). But little progress has been made with regard to other emitting sectors of the economy – transport, industry, buildings and farming. Alreasy, the UK is well off-track to achieve the fourth carbon budget, which runs until 2028. The shift to EVs isn’t exactly going as planned, and the public’s fondness for SUVs isn’t helping either.

Agriculture apparently accounts for around 12% of the UK’s emissions, but the government has picked a fight with farmers, and co-operation might be in short supply. At this point the Guardian trotted off to obtain a quote from another of its favourite organisations – in this case from Tom Lancaster of the Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit (https://eciu.net/). He opined that the farming sector is well off-track and that significant acceleration in this area is needed:

Issues such as land use, production and consumption of livestock products and demand-side policies are likely to feature more prominently [in the seventh carbon budget] than in previous carbon budget advice.

I trust I’m not alone in finding references to “ demand-side policies” as being more than a little sinister. It sounds like a euphemism for forcing the public to change their ways. Reading on, it appears that my suspicions might be correct. Next up is another old favourite – Friends of the Earth. Mike Childs, head of policy there, is quoted thus:

The deeper cuts neededto meet a 2040 goal can be met through more people choosing greener, cheaper and healthier lifestyles,” he said. “Already people are increasingly opting for meat and dairy alternatives and choosing to walk and cycle. The path to net zero should lead to better quality of life, particularly for those who have been left behind financially over the last decade.

It’s all there. Deeper cuts – doesn’t sound like a consumer-friendly option. More people must “choose” lifestyles which he claims (without supporting evidence) will be not only greener, but also cheaper and healthier. Greener and healthier I might accept, but colour me unconvinced on the claim that such options will be cheaper. I’m also unconvinced that what is being referred to as a choice really is just that. More likely we will be hectored and cajoled, and ultimately given no choice. The precedent is there already, after all, with regard to official diktats regarding EV and heat pump quotas. As to how healthy it is to cycle or walk several miles to work in the dark, cold and rain or snow in winter, rather than driving there, must be a moot point.

The only glimmer of hope is that the Guardian article ends by pointing out that the cross-party “consensus” regarding these issues is not so strong as it once was.

If Badenoch takes issue with the CCC’s findings, or vows to unravel the carbon budget should the Tories take back power, it would be an unmistakable sign that the crack has become a chasm.

Here’s hoping. Happy New Year!

via Climate Scepticism

https://ift.tt/N8BKwyb

December 31, 2024 at 01:05PM

The Ruby Mountains Gambit: Sabotaging America’s Energy Future for Political Games

It’s hard to view the Biden administration’s last-minute moves to withdraw 264,000 acres of federal land in Nevada’s Ruby Mountains from oil, gas, and geothermal development as anything but an exercise in obstruction. This isn’t about protecting the environment—it’s about tying the hands of an incoming administration poised to reverse disastrous climate policies. In the waning days of Biden’s presidency—or more accurately, in the waning days of an administration largely piloted by climate-obsessed staffers—the White House has ensured that its progressive priorities will remain legally sticky, even as the reins of power shift to a more rational energy policy.

The Biden administration’s gambit, which proposes a 20-year withdrawal of these lands from leasing, conveniently includes a two-year temporary leasing prohibition while the process meanders through the public comment phase. This puts the lands off-limits almost immediately, erecting a bureaucratic wall for any incoming administration. Yet, if there’s one thing the past few decades of governance have taught us, it’s that no regulation or policy is immune to challenge when approached with the right mix of legal acumen and political will.

The Real Motive: Entrenchment by Design

This isn’t just about protecting the Ruby Mountains. After all, even environmentalists admit there are no known oil reserves in the area, with some lamenting that the “urgent threat” is gold mining—an industry unaffected by this withdrawal. Instead, this is the latest chapter in a broader strategy by climate warriors to create legal and procedural tripwires to stymie any rollback of their agenda. By initiating the withdrawal just weeks before the administration changes hands, they seek to cloak their decisions in the shroud of legality, betting on the complexities of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and potential lawsuits to discourage or delay reversal.

To their credit, it’s a savvy play. By using the machinery of government to amplify their ideological priorities, they’ve thrown down a gauntlet that the next administration will need to pick up carefully if it intends to return sanity to federal energy policy.

What Can Be Done? An Action Plan for Reversal

For the incoming administration, time is of the essence. Fortunately, this particular gambit, while troublesome, is far from insurmountable. Since the withdrawal is still within the public comment period when new agency leadership takes over, there are straightforward pathways to undoing this politically motivated maneuver. Here’s how:

1. Decline to Finalize the Rule

The easiest way to deal with this proposed withdrawal is simply to let it die on the vine. Under the APA, the incoming leaders of the relevant agencies—likely the Department of the Interior—have the discretion to review all public comments and decide whether or not to move forward. The Trump administration can simply conclude that comments opposing the withdrawal carry more weight and opt not to finalize the rule.

This approach avoids the procedural complexity of undoing a finalized withdrawal and sidesteps the two-year temporary prohibition. Once the rule is abandoned, the lands revert to their previous status, making oil, gas, and geothermal leasing immediately available.

2. Build a Strong, Reasoned Justification

If environmental groups or other stakeholders attempt to sue over the decision to abandon the rule, the administration must be prepared to defend its actions. Courts demand a “reasoned explanation” for any policy shift, meaning the administration must clearly articulate why the proposed withdrawal is unnecessary or harmful. The rationale could include:

  • The absence of known oil reserves, rendering the withdrawal pointless as a practical matter.
  • The economic harm to local communities, particularly in terms of lost opportunities for geothermal energy development.
  • The narrow focus on oil and gas, while leaving mining activities untouched, exposing the withdrawal as arbitrary.

3. Rescind the Temporary Withdrawal

The Biden administration’s two-year leasing prohibition, implemented while the rule is under consideration, is another hurdle that the Trump administration could tackle directly. By issuing an executive order or agency memorandum, the new leadership can cancel the temporary freeze and restart leasing processes immediately. This might provoke legal challenges, but with sound reasoning and proper documentation, such an action is likely defensible.

Time to Call Out the Farce

What’s particularly galling about this whole episode is the blatant bad faith on display. The Ruby Mountains, as noted by the U.S. Forest Service in 2019, are unsuitable for oil and gas development, and conservationists themselves acknowledge there’s no viable oil to be found. The real aim here is to signal virtue to environmentalist allies while throwing procedural roadblocks in front of an administration determined to restore energy independence. The theater kids running this show are less interested in real-world outcomes than in satisfying their ideological fan base.

Conclusion: Undoing the Damage

The Biden administration’s Ruby Mountains withdrawal is a textbook example of using regulatory theatrics to pursue political goals under the guise of conservation. It’s not about protecting lands or species—it’s about binding the hands of future leaders with red tape and legal complexity. Fortunately, the incoming Trump administration has tools at its disposal to reverse course quickly and effectively.

By refusing to finalize the rule, rescinding the temporary freeze, and articulating a clear defense of its decisions, the Trump administration can ensure that America’s energy future isn’t held hostage to environmentalist dogma. It’s time to call out these games for what they are: an ideologically driven attempt to sabotage responsible energy policy. The new administration has the opportunity—and the obligation—to restore common sense to federal land management, putting the needs of the American people ahead of political theater.


Discover more from Watts Up With That?

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

via Watts Up With That?

https://ift.tt/pEthoJn

December 31, 2024 at 12:08PM

Do conventional and intermittent system have the same dynamic?

Recently, I came across the blog post titled The Dunkelflaute Disaster: What Happens When Wind Power Goes Silent. That post discusses the phenomenon known as Dunkelflaute, a German term that means “dark doldrums” (periods when there is little to no wind and sunlight, leading to a significant drop in energy production from wind and solar). The post highlights the challenges faced during such events and the importance of having (fossil fuel) backup energy. I generally don’t look much at the comment section, but in this case I did and by doing so found an interesting question.

It started with the comment that “it is impossibly expensive to run two energy systems in parallel”, which then lead to this response:

Have you added up to see if that is true? We’ve been running multiple systems for a long time. Coal with gas, and particularly with gas peakers.
The thing is, wind and sun are free, so the fuel savings are very great, and can offset a lot of costs.

I surely agree that grids have been running multiple systems for a long time. Conventional systems indeed used to run base load combined with peaker power plants, but the commenter seem to suggest that intermittent systems with backup are somehow comparable with base load with peakers because they both run multiple systems. As far as I understand, base load/peaker systems and intermittent/backup systems have their own dynamic and are not one-to-one comparable.

So, how different are those two systems? Let’s compare both.

In an electricity grid, production should always be synchronized with demand. Traditionally, a system of base load and peaker plants were used to achieve this synchronization. In such a system, base load power plants run continuously over extended periods of time, ideally producing roughly the same as the minimum demand. This base load can be nuclear power, but also hydro, coal or gas. When there is more demand than what base load provides, then peaker plants kick in, filling in the gap between demand and base load. This is how it looks like simplified (just as illustration):

Chart27e: Base load plus Peakers

Base load plants will continuously produce electricity (red area) and peaker plant production (purple area) kicks in when demand is higher than base load.

This is very simplified. In reality the peak capacity will be higher than just the maximum demand, there will be extra capacity available for unexpected situations. There are also levels in peak capacity (fast reacting and slow reacting backup).

Trying to do the same for the intermittent system plus backup will give something like this (also here, simplified and without safety margins):

Chart27e: Intermittent plus Backup

In this case, there is no guaranteed production. The intermittent production (the orange area) is between almost zero production (dunkelflaute) and high production (sunny and windy day). The rest needs to be filled in by backup capacity (the light blue area).

Now side by side to get the proportions right:

Chart27e: Base load vs Intermittent load

In the conventional system, base load and peakers work complementary. The total capacity is at least equal to the maximum demand (again, this is simplified, in reality there will be also safety margins etc.). The backup capacity is relatively low because peakers only need to react to changes of demand.

In the intermittent system, the backup system run more or less in parallel with the intermittent power sources. The electricity production by solar and wind is not guaranteed, therefore the backup capacity needs to be larger than in the conventional system. This because backup needs to react to changes of demand as well as to changes of intermittent solar/wind production. This means that more backup capacity is required in the intermittent system, meaning a larger capacity needs to be build, operated and maintained. Depending on the period, the backup will run at a low efficiency (extra fuel consumption). These costs will eventually result in a less economical viable system (then not only solar and wind will require financial support, also backup systems will).

I agree that we have run multiple systems for a long time. The sun and wind are free, but the installations to create electricity from sun and wind aren’t (and we need more of them, spread over a larger area). Integration of that intermittent energy into the grid is also not free. Reliables and renewables have different dynamics and different price components. This means that we can not just take a conventional system, replace some of it by intermittent power sources and then declare “a lot of” cost savings. I don’t see those lowering costs in the real world, despite increasing share of renewables.

via Trust, yet verify

https://ift.tt/yGvx8Sa

December 31, 2024 at 12:06PM