From CFACT

By David Wojick

A bad idea is emerging in the “renewables” world, namely that projects can buy their way out of destroying natural habitats. The wind and solar projects still destroy the natural habitats they are built on but they fund a magic wand that somehow supposedly creates new compensating habitat someplace else. Not really.

The fallacy here is that every acre in America already has a habitat. You can change an acre’s habitat from one form to another but not create one. It is a zero sum game.

There is a long standing, highly specialized development offset program that helps make the point. This is wetlands protection under section 404 of the Clean Water Act. Wetlands are deemed to be so special that filling one in for development can be offset by creating one someplace else.

But if you convert dry land to wetland you have destroyed the dry land habitat. So the amount of habitat destruction is not reduced, just the amount of wetland destruction.

The supposed renewables habitat destruction offset does nothing like the 404 program. The renewables developer simply pays to have habitat created someplace else which is impossible. For reference these programs are often called Biodiversity Offsetting which sounds nice.

Such a program might create habitat somewhere that matches that destroyed by the renewables project but that requires destroying the present habitat of the offset site. For example creating a woodland by destroying a grassland. Or vice versa, bulldozing a forest to create a grassland. This might even mean destroying farmland.

Clearly this is nonsense. It is a form of indulgences, which means paying for sin, in this case the sin of habitat destruction. Because solar and wind certainly destroy the habitat they are developed on.

It gets even worse with offshore wind, which has actually been proposed. Suppose a 100 square mile offshore wind array destroys a fishery. There is no way to go someplace else and create an equivalent fishery. Fisheries are found not made.

Nor is this offshore wind offset impossibility limited to fisheries. Wind turbines are projected to create wake effects that reduce the productivity of downward marine feeding grounds. This depletion can adversely affect the entire local food chain. We cannot simply go elsewhere and increase productivity.

Note that floating wind is even worse in this regard. An array of giant floating turbines requires an immense underwater web of mooring lines. This web might simply fence out the larger marine animals, rendering their habitat uninhabitable.

Which brings us to what is likely the worst case when it comes to the impossibility of offsetting habitat destruction on land or sea. The case is that of endangered species occupying the renewables development site. If their habitat is destroyed by development one cannot simply move them to some other newly prepared site far away. Nor can one build a distant habitat and expect them to come to it.

Which makes floating wind’s destructive impact on endangered species habitat the worst of the worst case. In particular there is the recent federal leasing of floating wind sites off of Maine and Massachusetts in the Gulf of Maine. The Gulf is designated as critical habitat for the desperately endangered North Atlantic Right Whale. The critical habitat lost from floating wind development cannot be offset, period.

In summary all that supposed habitat destruction offsets for renewables development can do is create the fiction that the destruction is okay. As with indulgences the sin has been paid for but only on paper.

Paul Homewood recently drew our attention to a Private Members’ Bill currently making its way through Parliament. As a quick look at Wikipedia tells us, however, the Bill (the Climate and Nature Bill) has been hanging around Parliament for a few years now in one form or another. It was originally introduced by the then sole Green Party MP, Caroline Lucas, when it was called the Climate and Ecology Bill. This time it has been presented by a Liberal Democrat MP, Dr Roz Savage. She came third in the private members’ ballot, so the Bill will be allocated Parliamentary time. Its second reading is due to take place in the House of Commons on 24^th January 2025.

If you undertake an internet search for “climate and nature crisis”, you will be overwhelmed by the volume of search results. Its seems to be a given that the “climate crisis” (sic) and a crisis in nature are inextricably interlinked. My own search produced in the following order, links to the websites of the following: ClientEarth; the UK government; the RSPB; The Wildlife Trusts; BMJ Mental Health; UN Environment Programme; the European Union; WWF; the UK Health Alliance on Climate Change; and many, many more. Even the election manifesto of the current UK government, before this year’s general election, claims the following:

The climate crisis has accelerated the nature crisis. Whilst Britain enjoys remarkable natural beauty, the Conservatives have left Britain one of the most nature-depleted countries in the world. Labour will deliver for nature, taking action to meet our Environment Act targets, and will work in partnership with civil society, communities and business to restore and protect our natural world.

I’m as keen as anyone on preserving nature, allowing itself to regenerate where possible, and to ensure that our beautiful wild places are left as undisturbed as possible. My uneasiness with the simplistic narrative that the “climate crisis” (sic) and the nature crisis are inextricably linked, is that the proponents of that view tend to believe that the industrial scale deployment of “renewable” energy in our wild places will solve both “crises”. Sadly, the reality is that the climate will remain completely unaffected by humanity’s efforts in this regard, but the natural world will be massively damaged by those very efforts. That’s why one of my early contributions here at Cliscep was Saving the Planet by Trashing it. I there cited a Guardian article from 15^th March 2021 titled “The race to zero: can America reach net-zero emissions by 2050?” and complained that the picture it set out was to my mind a Dantean vision of hell. To achieve President Biden’s “green” targets, we were told, would involve the need for:

…around 590,000 sq km (or 227,800 sq miles) of America to be blanketed in turbines and panels, around a tenth of all the land in the contiguous US. If you took a stroll along an Atlantic-facing beach there would be a good chance you’d see renewable energy in all directions, with an expanse of ocean the size of Belgium dotted with towering offshore wind turbines.

The attempts to mitigate the “climate crisis” will cause massive environmental damage, and yet the advocates of these “solutions” don’t seem to see it – or if they do, they are unconcerned. And now the UK faces the prospect of a new piece of oxymoronic legislation that, although running to just nine clauses, will – if enacted – massively build on the problems already associated with the Climate Change Act. It’s supposedly a Bill to restore nature while dealing with the “climate crisis”, but it’s a Bill that would destroy what’s left of the UK’s environment while claiming to be its defender. It’s worse than that, though. Let’s take a look.

Duty of the Secretary of State – climate and nature targets

Clause 1 is mandatory – the Secretary of State must achieve the two objectives set out in clause 1(2). The first objective is described as the “climate target”. Under it, the UK must:

reduce its overall contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions to net zero at a rate consistent with— (i) limiting the global mean temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels as defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; and (ii) fulfilling its obligations and commitments under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, taking into account the United Kingdom’s and other countries’ common but differentiated responsibilities, and respective capabilities, considering national circumstances.

This rather ignores the fact that the UK has no binding “obligations and commitments under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement”, but it would impose a legal obligation on the UK government to abide by a non-binding international agreement which other countries will feel free to (and no doubt will) ignore.

The second objective is the “nature target”. To achieve this, the Secretary of State must achieve a series of objectives that are directly threatened by his current plans (which would presumably be accelerated and increased if this Bill is enacted) to “decarbonise” the national grid. Specifically, the UK is to:

halt and reverse its overall contribution to the degradation and loss of nature in the United Kingdom and overseas [my emphasis] by— (i) increasing the health, abundance, diversity and resilience of species, populations, habitats and ecosystems so that by 2030, and measured against a baseline of 2020, nature is visibly and measurably on the path of recovery; (ii) fulfilling its obligations under the UNCBD and its protocols and the commitments set out in the Leaders’ Pledge for Nature and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework; and (iii) following the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

Clause 8 contains a number of definitions, for the purposes of the Bill. Thus:

First definition:

UNCBD and its protocols” means the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, which entered into force on 29 December 1993, and all subsequent agreements and protocols arising from it.

The UN website makes it clear that the Convention is non-binding:

Its overall objective is to encourage actions, which will lead to a sustainable future.

Second definition:

“the Leaders’ Pledge for Nature” means the agreement of the United Nations Summit on Biodiversity of 28 September 2020.

A summary of this can be found here. As usual, while containing much that is desirable and very easy to support, it’s utterly non-binding, and certainly isn’t a “pledge” to do anything. It contains the usual cop-outs, such as:

While many countries reiterated their willingness to continue to protect, conserve and restore their natural resources, some said they would do so while considering the need to boost their economies and provide for the livelihoods of their people. Several mentioned difficulties in fully implementing their biodiversity strategies due to conflict and lack of resources.

The Bill seeks to impose a legal duty on all UK governments to implement an international “pledge” that won’t be binding on other governments and will, in all probability, be widely ignored.

Third definition:

“the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” means the framework adopted by the decision of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in Montreal on 19 December 2022.

Its text can be found here. It is a lengthy and detailed document, which contains much of which I approve. However, as is usual with UN COPs, it’s full of aspiration and no binding obligations. While the rest of the world will be free to ignore it (as, by and large, it currently ignores the injunctions preached at the end of each climate COP), this legislation seeks to make it binding on the UK government.

Other definitions:

“nature” includes— (a) the abundance, diversity and distribution of animal, plant, fungal and microbial life, (b) the extent and condition of habitats, and (c) the health and integrity of ecosystems;

“ecosystems” includes natural and managed ecosystems and the air, soils, water and abundance and diversity of organisms of which they are composed.

Duty of the Secretary of State: climate and nature strategy

Clause 2(1) imposes an obligation on the Secretary of State to publish and lay before Parliament a strategy for achieving the clause 1 objectives, and to do so within 12 months of the Bill becoming law. By clause 2(2), the strategy must include annual interim targets consistent with the achievement of the objectives, and the Secretary of State must take all reasonable steps to achieve the interim targets. There is clearly to be no back-sliding of the sort that has seen interim targets ditched in Scotland along the road towards its unachievable 2045 net zero nirvana.

Clause 2(3) is where it starts to get rather scary. It sets out eight very specific measures that must be included in the strategy so as to achieve the objectives. For example, the UK’s total emissions of CO2 must be limited to no more than its proportionate share of the remaining global carbon budget. As if that’s not enough, a look at the definitions in clause 8 enables one to see just how extraordinarily prescriptive this draft legislation is:

“the United Kingdom’s total emissions of carbon dioxide” means— (a) all territorial emissions of carbon dioxide from the United Kingdom, and (b) all emissions of carbon dioxide generated by the United Kingdom’s share of international aviation and shipping, emitted between 2020 and 2050.

Thus there is to be no hiding from the country’s total emissions by limiting them to land-based emissions as is currently the case.

Also:

“remaining global carbon budget” means 400 billion tonnes of carbon 40 dioxide.

Very precise. And, in case you were wondering:

“proportionate share of the remaining global carbon budget” means the share of the remaining global carbon budget in proportion to the United Kingdom’s share of the global population, averaged over the period 2020 to 2050, using United Kingdom forecast population data from the Office for National Statistics and global forecast population data from Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 1;

“greenhouse gas” has the same meaning as in section 92 of the Climate Change Act 2008

The next measure that must be achieved is the reduction of CO2 emissions in respect of imports to the UK, at the same rate is achieved for reductions of emissions under the first measure. Again, there is to be no hiding or ducking the issue:

“emissions of carbon dioxide in respect of imports to the United Kingdom” means emissions of carbon dioxide generated outside the United Kingdom by the production of goods that are imported to the United Kingdom, and by the provision of services overseas that are received in the United Kingdom.

Exporting our jobs and manufacturing capacity, and emissions along with them, will no longer be an option. How we repatriate the jobs and manufacturing capacity while reducing our emissions under the first measure, however, is quite beyond me. Probably we will rapidly return to the Stone Age instead.

The third measure is the reduction of the UK’s emissions of greenhouses gases other than CO2 at rates consistent with a proportionate UK contribution to limiting “global heating” to 1.5C. Unless I missed it, global heating isn’t defined, but I suppose it’s to be read consistently with clause 1(2)(a)(i) above.

The fourth measure is to ensure the end of the exploration, extraction, export and import of fossil fuels by the United Kingdom as rapidly as possible.

The fifth measure is to ensure that steps taken under the strategy to mitigate emissions in the UK and overseas minimise damage to ecosystems, food and water availability, and human health, as far as possible. I find that turn of phrase to be very interesting. It seems to be implicit within it that the industrialisation of the UK’s wild places by the continuing spread of renewable energy and associated infrastructure is damaging to “ecosystems, food and water availability, and human health” but that such damage, while ideally to be minimised, is ultimately a price that will just have to be paid. Clearly the first objective (the climate target) overrides the second (the nature target).

The sixth measure is to restore and expand natural ecosystems and enhance the management of cultivated ecosystems, in the UK and overseas, to protect and enhance biodiversity, ecological processes, and ecosystem service provision.

The seventh measure is to ensure that all activities in the UK which affect the health, abundance, diversity and resilience of species, populations and ecosystems prioritise avoidance of the loss of nature, through adherence to the Mitigation and Conservation Hierarchy. Needless to say, this is also defined in clause 8, thus:

the hierarchy adopted by resolution 58 of the World Conservation Congress at the 35 International Union for Conservation of Nature from 1 to 10 September 2016.

The final measure is to take every possible step to avoid, where avoidance is not possible, limit, and where limiting is not possible, restore, or otherwise offset, the adverse impacts in the United Kingdom and overseas [my emphasis] on ecosystems and human health of— (i) United Kingdom-generated production and consumption of goods and services, and (ii) all related trade, transport and financing including impacts from the extraction of raw materials, deforestation, land and water degradation, pollution and waste production.

Very desirable and easy to insist upon. Very difficult to achieve and no doubt extraordinarily expensive.

As if all that’s not enough, the priority to be given to the reduction of GHG emissions is made clear by clause 2(4). It provides that those reductions, as required by the first three measures, are to be achieved “as far and as rapidly as possible.”

In the world of motherhood and apple pie, it seems anything is possible. Clause 2(5) goes on to add yet more requirements to the strategy. It must (that mandatory language again):

(a) in the opinion of the Secretary of State, be projected to have an overall positive impact on— (i) local communities with a high deprivation rating according to Government deprivation indices; (ii) young people; and (iii) people with protected characteristics under section 4 of the Equality Act 2010; (b) set out how the requirements under paragraph (a) have been met; and (c) include financial support and retraining for people whose livelihoods and jobs will be affected by the proposed measures—including those measures that require transitioning out of industries characterised by high emissions and high impacts on ecosystems.

Good luck with all of that. At this point I think it’s fair to say that anyone appointed to be the relevant Secretary of State, should this Bill become law, will definitely have been handed a poisoned chalice.

Public Involvement

Now we arrive at clause 3. Alert readers, who may recall Ode to Joy, which I wrote almost ten months ago, will realise that I am not at all impressed by what follows. That is because clause 3 goes down the road of introducing a body to be called a Climate and Nature Assembly (“the Assembly”). I am totally opposed to the idea of citizens’ assemblies, for the simple reason that busy people with meaningful lives won’t serve on them. Instead, they will be populated by the retired, the unemployed, and by activists. They also require someone to organise them and steer their deliberations. Inevitably those people will also be activists, who see citizens’ assemblies as a means by which their views can be given spurious democratic legitimacy. There is nothing democratic about these processes. Rather, they are the antithesis of democracy.

Having got that off my chest, what does clause 3 stipulate? It says (by subclause (1)) that the Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of the Bill into law, procure, by open tender, an expert independent body to establish the Assembly, comprising a representative sample of the UK population. The Assembly must then be established no later than three months therafter. And as I knew would be the case, the Assembly must consider relevant expert advice and publish its recommendations for measures to be included in the strategy. “Relevant expert advice”, needless to say, isn’t defined – all the more scope for activists to take over the process.

At this point, the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) and the Climate Change Committee (CCC) are brought in to play. Working together, they must consider the Assembly’s recommendations and “relevant expert advice” and must then publish a joint proposal for measures to be included in the strategy, including all recommendations by the Assembly that have the support of 66% or more of its members unless, in the opinion of either the CCC or the JNCC, there are exceptional and compelling reasons, which must be stated, not to implement those recommendations.

Then the Secretary of State must include in the strategy all recommendations by the Assembly that have the support of 66% or more of its members, where those recommendations are also jointly proposed by the CCC and the JNCC (but not if, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, there are exceptional and compelling reasons, which must be stated in the strategy, not to implement those recommendations.

Duties of the Committee on Climate Change and the Joint Nature Conservation Committee

The CCC and the JNCC must— (a) evaluate, monitor and report annually on the implementation of the strategy and on the achievement of the interim targets; (b) undertake the duties referred to above (i.e. with regard to the Assembly) and also by clause 6 (Acceptance and implementation of the strategy and any revisions) – see below. Furthermore, The CCC must recommend annual emissions budgets for each greenhouse gas for the United Kingdom, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland with a view to the requirements of the climate and nature strategies being met.

Approval by devolved legislatures

Clause 5 is of relevance to the devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, since the Bill is designed to apply to the whole of the UK. Happily the details here aren’t relevant to a general critique of this absurd piece of draft legislation, so I shall say no more about them.

Acceptance and implementation of the strategy and any revisions

Clause 6 provides that the Secretary of State must lay the strategy before the House of Commons and a Minister of the Crown must move a motion “That this House approves the Climate and Nature Strategy, laid before this House on [date]”. The Secretary of State must then implement the strategy, including any amendments made to it by the House of Commons and any revisions made pursuant to subclause (6), which provides:

If, at any time, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, the CCC or the JNCC based on up-to-date scientific evidence, or of the House of Commons expressed by resolution, the measures in the strategy or the interim targets are unlikely to achieve the objectives, the Secretary of State must revise the strategy, or make a statement to the House of Commons explaining why a revision is not necessary.

Finally, the Secretary of State must report annually to Parliament on the implementation of the strategy or any revisions to it, and on progress towards achieving the objectives and interim targets.

Conclusion

I think its fair to say that this is one of the most well-meaning, yet absurd, pieces of draft legislation I have ever seen. It seeks to impose mutually contradictory obligations on the Secretary of State (to add to his mutually contradictory job title – energy security and net zero). It seeks to impose a legal liability to implement foreign treaties that aren’t binding on the rest of the world, and to require the UK to take on its fair share of greenhouse gas reduction whether or not the rest of the world follows suit (needless to say, it won’t). There is no provision for the obligations to be reviewed should it become apparent that they have become futile and counter-productive or should scientific opinion alter. It is an attempt to write in tablets of stone the current extremist version of the climate change religion. Given the Herculean, contradictory and indeed unachievable tasks it seeks to impose as a duty, it represents, in my opinion, peak stupidity.

Postscript

A significant number of MPs (more than 180 to date) are publicly supporting this nonsense. If you want to see if yours is among them, you can find out here.